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Power Couples: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the 
State of Their Unions 
Susan Frelich Appleton*  
Robyn M. Rimmer** 
In recent years Congress has made marriage a staple of its 
legislative menu, introducing constitutional amendments to “protect 
marriage,”1 deploying public funds to encourage “healthy marriage,”2 
and seeking tax reform to abolish forever the so-called “marriage 
penalty.”3 Yet, for many years, Congress’s well-publicized 
preoccupation with marriage law and policy has revealed notable 
gaps. First, Congress has ignored a phenomenon blossoming in its 
own backyard, the growing number of lawmakers married to 
 
 * Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe Couzins Professor of Law, Washington University.  
 ** Washington University School of Law, J.D.; former Senate legislative fellow and 
political consultant. The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful discussions with or thoughtful 
comments on earlier drafts by Cheryl Block, June Carbone, Kathleen Clark, Torey Cummings, 
Sylvia de Leon, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Craig Holman, Roberta Reisinger, Laura 
Rosenbury, participants in the Washington University School of Law faculty workshop series, 
and participants at the “Following Marriage” session at the 2006 Law & Society annual 
meeting—even if this essay fails to reflect all of their valuable suggestions. For research 
assistance, we thank Lauren Taub for her considerable efforts and Melanie Edwards for her 
contribution at the start of this project.  
 1. See H.R.J. Res. 88, 109th Cong. (2006) (proposed federal constitutional amendment); 
S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005). Twenty-seven states have adopted constitutional amendments 
banning same-sex marriage. See CHRISTINE VESTAL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE RIPE FOR DECISION 
IN 3 COURTS 5 (2007), http://www.stateline.org/live/digitalAssets/7990_Same-sex_marriage. 
pdf.  
 2. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7103, 120 Stat. 138 (to be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 603). This 2006 reauthorization of welfare reform legislation includes 
$100 million annually for state initiatives to promote “healthy marriages,” specifically pro-
marriage programs. Id.; see generally Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 
11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307 (2004); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: 
Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1647 
(2005). 
 3. See H.R. 3384, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 78, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposals “to make 
permanent marriage penalty relief”). 
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lobbyists—unions that we call “power couples” for short.4 This first 
gap discloses a second and related omission: lawmakers have avoided 
looking behind the slogans to grapple with the tensions that pervade 
contemporary understandings of marriage—tensions created by the 
challenge of reconciling concepts of spousal individuality, marital 
unity, and gender equality in a modern incarnation of a very 
traditional institution.5 
With action at the start of the 110th Congress, however, the 
Senate has taken a small step into the breach by proposing significant 
restrictions on spouses in legislator-lobbyist marriages. Responding 
to widespread news of government corruption, the Senate passed 
comprehensive ethics reform, including a previously little-noted 
amendment by Senator David Vitter (R-LA)6 that would prohibit all 
senators from having official contact with any senator’s spouse who 
is a registered lobbyist or who is employed or retained by a registered 
lobbyist.7 As of this writing, uncertainties about whether the measure 
will become law remain, given the much more modest regulation of 
power couples adopted by the House of Representatives in its new 
House Rules8 and its subsequently adopted bill.9 Indeed, even 
 
 4. We borrow the phrase “power couples” from colloquial discourse to refer specifically 
to legislator-lobbyist marriages. Of course, there are other types of “power couples” that evoke 
similar, yet distinct, questions. For example, the activities of “First Ladies,” here and abroad, 
have received analysis. See, e.g., Sara Krausert, Comment, From Baking Bread to Making 
Dough: Legal and Societal Restrictions on the Employment of First Ladies, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 243 (1998) (discussing, inter alia, the service of attorney Hillary Rodham Clinton 
during Bill Clinton’s presidency); David Carr, Is Shriver Still Working for “Today”?, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 6, 2005, at C1 (discussing journalist Maria Shriver, “first lady of California”); 
Alan Cowell, British Press Scolds Mrs. Blair Over a Speech in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 
2005, at A8 (discussing attorney Cherie Booth, wife of British Prime Minister Tony Blair). 
 5. Several high-profile judicial opinions and commentaries suggest that the debate 
focuses exclusively on whether the central purpose of marriage is sexual reproduction and 
childrearing. Compare Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003), 
with Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7–8 (N.Y. 2006), and Andersen v. King County, 138 
P.3d 963, 969 (Wash. 2006). Cf. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
  6.  We find information about the legislators’ party affiliations and states relevant to our 
analysis. As a result, we have inserted these abbreviated indications parenthetically after the 
first reference in the text to a legislator by name. When a legislator’s name appears in a footnote 
before it appears in text, we have also included this parenthetical information in the footnote.  
 7. S. 1, 110th Cong. § 113(a), (b), (d) (2007). The measure includes an exception for 
spouses who worked as lobbyists for a year before the election or marriage. Id. § 113(c). 
 8. H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. (2007); see infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text 
(discussing H. Res. 6, 110th Cong. (2007)). These changes were adopted as rules for the House, 
not as legislation, so they do not need to pass the Senate nor get the President’s signature. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/9
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senators who supported the measure have expressed doubts about its 
ability to survive in the Senate-House Conference Committee.10 
Whatever the ultimate fate of the Senate’s response to spousal 
lobbying, the measure provides a revealing lens through which to 
examine a number of unsettled issues. For example, one set of issues 
is political and practical. Prior to the Senate’s unexpected action, 
observers had predicted that meaningful reform would never reach 
these power couples, regardless of the party controlling Congress, 
because of the incidence of such marriages among Democrats and 
Republicans alike.11 What prompted the Senate to defy such 
predictions and to take the particular approach that it adopted, 
passing a significant ethics reform bill with numerous amendments 
that escaped individual votes?12 
In addition, the Senate’s regulation of power couples—as part of a 
more sweeping response to entanglements between Congress and K 
Street13—invites reflection on the practice of “business as usual” in 
 
 9. H.R. Res. 2316, 110th Cong. (2007); see infra notes 45–46, 205 and accompanying 
text (discussing this bill). 
 10. See Interview by Fox News with Senator David Vitter (Jan. 19, 2007) (Vitter’s 
expressions of doubt); see also Gail Russell Chaddock, After House’s “100-Hour” Rush, a 
Senate Slowdown, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/ 
0122/p02s01-uspo.html (quoting skepticism about enactment of such “strengthening” 
amendments by Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK), who voted against the bill). 
 11. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Democrats Split on How Far to Go with Ethics Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, § 1, at 1; John Solomon, Lawmakers’ Lobbying Spouses Avoid Hill 
Reforms, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2007, at A1; see also infra notes 50–60; cf. Will Sullivan, Much 
Easier Said Than Done, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 4, 2007, at 22 (reporting difficulties 
encountered by ethics reform, despite Democrats’ pledge). 
 12. The Senate barely debated Senator Vitter’s various efforts to stop spousal lobbying. 
See 153 CONG. REC. S742 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. S637–41 (daily ed. Jan. 
17, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. S491–92 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. S322–23 (daily 
ed. Jan. 10, 2007). Further, no committee considered the amendment, it had no hearing, and the 
vote occurred only after the amendment, along with several others, was incorporated into the 
bill by unanimous consent. In addition, members of both the Democratic and Republican 
leadership expressed opposition to Vitter’s efforts, although they voted for the bill. See 
Solomon, supra note 11 (noting opposition of Majority Leader Senator Harry Reid (D-NV)); 
Chaddock, supra note 10 (noting concerns of Minority Whip Senator Trent Lott (R-MS)); see 
also Fredreka Schouten, Senate Democrats Fight Proposal to Ban Relatives Lobbying; Some 
Back It Only if Family Members Are Grandfathered, USA TODAY, Jan. 18, 2007, at A4 (noting 
opposition of Reid and Rules Committee Chair Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA)). 
 13. K Street, a short-hand way to refer collectively to lobbyists, is the site of many 
influential lobbying firms in Washington, D.C. Led by former House Majority Leader Tom 
DeLay, Republicans launched the “K Street Project” in 1995 to press lobbying firms to fill 
high-level positions with Republicans. SourceWatch, K Street Project, http://www.sourcewatch. 
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the nation’s capital in the early twenty-first century. Criticizing 
government corruption, pundits had raised questions about power 
couples. One news story asked, “How can a member of Congress 
possibly share a bed and a bank account with a member of the 
persuasion industry without a life laced by conflicts of interest?”14 
Frank Clemente, director of Public Citizen’s Congress Watch, ranked 
the legislator-lobbyist marriage “way up there on the unseemly 
scale.”15 Another news report on family lobbying called the 
phenomenon “an increasingly popular maneuver in the age-old game 
of influence-seeking in Washington” and observed that today “when 
a corporation or interest group wants support from a key member of 
Congress, it often hires a member of the lawmaker’s family.”16 
These ethical issues, in turn, raise theoretical questions about our 
contemporary understanding of marriage—questions of family law at 
the heart of this essay. First, some ethics experts identify the problem 
raised by power couples, put in its most benign form, as one 
concerning appearances.17 Given the importance of appearances and 
a prevailing ethical standard that emphasizes the need to avoid even 
appearances of impropriety, perceptions of the activities and 
relationships of legislator-lobbyist spouses necessarily loom large. 
What does the response to such power couples say about how we 
conceptualize marriage today?18 Second, this essay reveals the 
 
org/index.php?title=K_Street_Project (last visited Feb. 2, 2007); see infra notes 22–30 and 
accompanying text. The House of Representatives ended the K Street Project via rules adopted 
at the beginning of the 110th Congress. H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. § 202 (2007).  
 14. See Glen Justice, When Lawmaking and Lobbying Are All in the Family, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 9, 2005, § 4, at 3. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Chuck Neubauer et al., The Senators’ Sons; A Washington Bouquet: Hire a 
Lawmaker’s Kid, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 2003, at A1. Of course, such accusations emphasize that 
the lobbying firms and their clients should not escape responsibility for the problems attributed 
to the rise of power couples. 
 17. Justice, supra note 14 (attributing this view to Stanley Brand, an ethics advisor to 
lawmakers and former Democratic counsel to the House). 
 18. This significant element of our analysis, standards in which appearances of 
impropriety serve as a touchstone for unethical conduct, brings an unavoidably circular quality 
to the inquiry. Under this appearance-based standard, public perceptions and understandings of 
marriage, of politics, and of integrity all mark out the ethical limits. And although we do not 
reject the possibility that government actors support and follow high ethical standards for their 
own sake, we acknowledge that contemporary officials’ emphasis on “spin” means that those 
held to these standards not only make the rules but also work hard to construct the very 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/9
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importance of taking a closer look at “the state of the unions” in 
question, specifically the variations among these marriages and the 
manner in which these couples exercise, use, and share the power 
colloquially attributed to them. Ultimately, we question the 
conventional wisdom that the rise of power couples necessarily 
manifests gender equality in the public sphere. Instead, we suspect 
that these couples often re-inscribe the traditional stereotype, in 
which the husband is the preeminent spouse and the wife plays the 
role of helpmate, and we urge consideration of this issue in any 
evaluation of the Senate’s action and other possible reforms. 
In exploring power couples, the appearances that they evoke, and 
the web of relationships that we can trace to each of the spouses, this 
essay ventures not only into the space between the political and 
theoretical, but also into the space between the rules for marriage 
entry19 and marriage exit20 that have dominated popular and scholarly 
conversations.21 We begin by looking back, examining the calls for 
ethics reform that preceded the Senate’s move to restrict spousal 
lobbying, the anecdotes and data that establish the prevalence of 
power couples during the 109th Congress, and still earlier history 
tracing the rise of so-called “political spouses.” Next, we consider 
pertinent statutes and other rules that prevailed before the 110th 
Congress embarked on serious reform, and we compare these to the 
new restrictions and to other possible changes. We then situate these 
laws—old, new, and merely hypothetical—in the context of modern 
family law’s construction of marriage, asking whether marriage 
merits treatment different from that of other intimate and family 
relationships and what role considerations of gender equality should 
play. We conclude by identifying a challenge: the difficulty of 
 
perceptions that account for the all-important appearances. Of course, whatever the significance 
of appearances in the existing regime and in possible reforms, this focus should not obviate 
consideration of substantive problems and changes. 
 19. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 20. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2002); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Op-Ed., Don’t Let Divorce Off the Hook, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, § 14, at 13. 
 21. Although discussions of marriage entry and exit predominate, a few scholars have 
addressed the subjects of the ongoing marriage and its legal treatment. Of these, Milton Regan 
and Stephanie Coontz stand out. See infra notes 135–36, 156–59 and accompanying text 
(relying on their work).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 207 Appleton Rimmer book pages.doc  10/2/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 24:207 
 
 
212
developing a nuanced approach that confronts directly the competing 
values at stake, such as protecting the public trust and institutional 
stature that belongs to Congress; maintaining respect for autonomy, 
pluralism, marriage, and gender equality; and minimizing 
exploitation and unequal access to government. 
I. PRACTICES AND OFFICIAL RULES 
A. Calls for Reform 
The scandal involving lobbyist Jack Abramoff not only exposed 
corruption on the part of United States Representatives Tom DeLay 
(R-TX), Randy Cunningham (R-CA), and Bob Ney (R-OH);22 it also 
reminded the public of the very common phenomenon of family ties 
between legislators and lobbyists. For example, news articles outlined 
the role of Pam Abramoff, Jack’s wife, as co-director of a nonprofit 
organization that served as a conduit for distributing funds from his 
lobbying clients to other projects.23 Such stories also detailed the 
involvement of legislators and their spouses implicated by 
Abramoff’s activities, including Representative John T. Doolittle (R-
CA) and his wife, Julie Doolittle, who worked on marketing and 
event planning for Abramoff, and Representative Tom DeLay and his 
wife, Christine DeLay, who received consulting fees from a firm 
connected with Abramoff.24 Indeed, agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) reportedly referred to the numerous spouses of 
lawmakers and lobbyists in the Abramoff investigation as “The 
Wives Club.”25 
 
 22. See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Ohio Congressman Is Said to Agree to Plead Guilty, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at A14. 
 23. See Philip Shenon, Lobbying Cases Highlight Prime Targets’ Family Ties, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, § 1, at 26. This article also reports questionable activities of Abramoff’s 
brother, Robert Abramoff, and the role of wives of lobbyists of the Alexander Strategy Group, 
which closed after revelations of links to Abramoff. Id.; see also Anne E. Kornblut, Once Just 
an Aide, Now a King of K Street, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, § 4, at 1 (describing how Capitol 
Hill staffers often become lobbyists). 
 24. See Shenon, supra note 23. 
 25. See id.; see also Bill Marsh, Capital Alert: The Unfolding Story of Brent Wilkes, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 21, 2006, § 4, at 16 (depicting “The Abramoff Web”); Norah O’Donnell, Did 
Washington Wives Benefit from Abramoff?, MSNBC.COM, Jan. 9, 2006, http://www.msnbc. 
msn.com/id/10774913. 
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In the move to reform the way Washington does business that 
followed the revelations about Abramoff and others, concerns about 
spouses began to surface. The New York Times asked “When 
Lobbyists Say ‘I Do,’ Should They Add ‘I Won’t’?” and reported a 
call by Senate Republican leaders for major rule changes, including a 
prohibition on lobbying by spouses and relatives.26 Then-Senator 
Rick Santorum (R-PA) touted his effort to add restrictions on 
lobbying by spouses and family members to the proposed Legislative 
Transparency and Accountability Act of 2006.27 The issue was not 
entirely a new one. In 2004, Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) sought a 
wide-ranging revision of ethics rules, including rules limiting 
lobbying by family members,28 amidst stories questioning the work 
of then-Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle’s (D-SD) lobbyist 
wife.29 
Nonetheless, the 109th Congress ended with no significant change 
and more of the same predicted for the 110th even after the 
Democrats prevailed in the November 2006 elections.30 The rules 
package swiftly adopted by the House limited power couples’ 
activities directly, but—true to predictions that little change would 
occur—only to the extent of barring spousal lobbyists from using 
exercise facilities open exclusively to members, other officials, and 
spouses,31 and indirectly through an earmark disclosure provision 
mandating certification that neither the sponsoring representative nor 
a spouse has a financial interest or other special benefit in the 
earmark.32 
 
 26. David D. Kirkpatrick, When Lobbyists Say ‘I Do,’ Should They Add ‘I Won’t’?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, § 1, at 30. 
 27. See Press Release, Senator Santorum Continues Work on Lobbying Reform 
Legislation (Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.politicspa.com/pressreleasedetailed.asp? 
id=1526. Senator Santorum lost his bid for reelection in November 2006. John M. Broder, 
Democrats Topple G.O.P. Incumbents in Three Senate Contests, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at 
P5.  
 28. Paul Kane & Damon Chappie, Ban on Family Lobbying Eyed, ROLL CALL (Wash., 
D.C.), Jan. 28, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 4022025; see also Paul Kane, GOP Makes Issue 
of Daschle’s Wife, ROLL CALL (Wash., D.C.), Oct. 26, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 
4025331 (citing regulations proposed by Senator Reid). 
 29. See Kane, supra note 28. 
 30. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 31. H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. § 511(c) (2007). 
 32. See id. § 404(b)17. The House took up ethics issues again, passing a bill, H.R. 2316, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In the Senate, however, developments took a more tortuous 
course. After the initial reading of the ethics reform bill on January 4, 
2007, the first day in session for the 110th Congress, debate began 
with the majority party allowing the minority party the opportunity to 
offer amendments.33 The next week witnessed continued debate, the 
introduction of amendments, and votes on such amendments, until a 
Republican effort to insert presidential line-item veto authority 
precipitated an impasse that threatened to derail the entire bill.34 The 
Democrats’ call for a cloture vote, which in turn limited subsequent 
amendments only to those deemed “germane,” set the stage for a little 
noticed measure introduced by Senator David Vitter that a majority 
of the Senate proved unwilling to oppose.35  
Senator Vitter’s original amendment would have criminalized all 
congressional lobbying by any spouse of a member of Congress, 
unless the spouse had worked as a registered lobbyist for at least one 
year before the member’s election.36 Senator Vitter later changed the 
amendment to a prohibition aimed at lawmakers, narrowing it to 
address only senators and their spouses’ lobbying the Senate, in part 
to satisfy the procedural requirement of “germaneness.”37 The 
modified provision was adopted by unanimous consent, along with 
several other amendments en bloc.38  
 
on May 24, 2007, which now goes to conference with the Senate’s bill. See 153 CONG. REC. 
H5776 (daily ed. May 24, 2007). 
 33. See supra note 12. 
 34. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Quarrel Stalls Movement of Ethics Bill in the Senate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A24; see also Erin Billings & John Stanton, Senate GOP Fires a Salvo, 
ROLL CALL (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 22, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 1241173. Ultimately, the 
issue of the line-item veto was to be addressed as part of a minimum-wage bill. Id. 
 35. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 36. See 153 CONG. REC. S322–23 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 2007). Senator Vitter also has 
introduced a separate measure that would punish such conduct by congressional spouses. S. 
105, 110th Cong. (2007). It has been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Thomas, 
S. 105, http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:SN00105:@@@L&summ2=m& (last 
visited May 6, 2007); see infra notes 207–19 and accompanying text.  
 37. 153 CONG. REC. S637–41 (daily ed. Jan. 17, 2007); see also 153 CONG. REC. S491–92 
(daily ed. Jan. 12, 2007). 
 38. 153 CONG. REC. S742 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 2007); see Greta Wodele, Stalemate Broken, 
Senate Passes Major Lobbying Measure, CONGRESS DAILY, Jan. 19, 2007, http://national 
journal.com/ (search “Stalemate Broken”; then follow “Item 1” hyperlink).  
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The Senate overwhelmingly passed the amended bill,39 with the 
following language included in section 113:  
 (a) If a Member’s spouse or immediate family member is a 
registered lobbyist under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 
or is employed or retained by such a registered lobbyist for the 
purpose of influencing legislation, the Member shall prohibit 
all staff employed by that Member (including staff in personal, 
committee, and leadership offices) from having any official 
contact with the Member’s spouse or immediate family 
member. 
 (b) Members and employees on the staff of a Member 
(including staff in personal, committee, and leadership offices) 
shall be prohibited from having any official contact with any 
spouse of a Member who is a registered lobbyist under the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, or is employed or retained 
by such a registered lobbyist.40 
 (c) The prohibition in subparagraph (a) shall not apply to 
the spouse of a Member who was serving as a registered 
lobbyist at least 1 year prior to the election of that Member to 
office or at least 1 year prior to [his or her] marriage to that 
member.41 
Subsection (a)’s modest restrictions, which simply make an 
individual senator’s office off-limits to lobbying by that senator’s 
own family members, including spouses, track measures that the 
Senate passed in earlier sessions.42 Subsections (b) and (c), however, 
 
 39. See U.S. Senate, Legislation & Records Home, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/ 
roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=110&session=1&vote=00019 (listing roll call 
votes for the first session of the 110th Congress). 
 40. S. 1, 110th Cong. § 113 (2007); 153 CONG. REC. S491–92 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 2007). 
As passed, the provision applies only to the Senate (with “Member” meaning “Senator”). Id. 
 41. S. 1, § 113; 153 CONG. REC. S491–92 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 2007). Senator Vitter has 
carefully distinguished this exception from a “grandfather clause” that some senators requested 
to allow those spouses currently lobbying to continue to do so. Id.; see Interview, supra note 10. 
 42. S. 2349, 109th Cong. § 110 (2006). This bill passed the Senate on March 29, 2006, but 
never became law. Like its predecessor in the 109th Congress, Senate Bill 1 defines “immediate 
family member” as “the son, daughter, stepson, stepdaughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, 
mother, father, stepmother, stepfather, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother, sister, stepbrother, 
or stepsister of the Member.” S. 1, § 113(d). 
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emerged directly from Senator Vitter’s more ambitious efforts to stop 
spousal lobbying.43 And although, read literally, the exception for 
those whose lobbying careers preceded the marriage or the senator’s 
election applies to subsection (a), media reports, including interviews 
with Senator Vitter, indicate that the exception applies to subsection 
(b).44  
The House responded several months later with a weaker, more 
restrained approach. Under the House’s ethics reform bill, just as 
under subsection (a) of Senator Vitter’s amendment, a representative 
must prohibit his staff from having official conduct with his own 
spouse if she is a lobbyist.45 In addition, the House bill includes a 
statement of “the sense of Congress that the use of a family 
relationship by a lobbyist who is an immediate family member of a 
Member of Congress to gain special advantages over other lobbyists 
is inappropriate.”46 The divergent approaches taken by the House and 
Senate as well as earlier news reports47 raise the possibility of 
significant change to Senator Vitter’s language once the two 
chambers must reconcile their competing approaches to make ethics 
reform law. Such changes might entail enlarging the prohibition in 
subsection (b) to cover other family members48 or, alternatively, 
eliminating the restriction altogether.49 
 
 43. 153 CONG. REC. S492 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 2007). 
 44. See Interview, supra note 10; see also Jan Baran & Robert Bauer, More Disclosure 
Likely with Senate Changes to Lobbyist Disclosure Act, ROLL CALL (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 24, 
2007, available at 2007 WLNR 1396204; Tory Newmyer, Lobby Loophole Clears Senate 
Spouses, ROLL CALL (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 24, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 1396175; 
Jonathan Weisman & Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Senate Passes Ethics Passage: Parties Reach Hard-
Fought Deal on Lobbying and Other Reforms, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2007, at A1. The Senate’s 
late-night frenzy explains the probable error. See Wodele, supra note 38 (quoting Senator Trent 
Lott (R-TN), who said “[A]nytime you’re in session after 9 o’clock, you’re going to mess 
things up and embarrass yourselves.”). 
 45. H.R. 2316, 110th Cong. § 401 (2007).  
 46. Id. § 209; see 153 CONG. REC. H5770–71 (daily ed. May 24, 2007). 
 47. See infra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
 48. See Newmyer, supra note 44. 
 49. See Chaddock, supra note 10. 
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B. Capitol Hill as a Family-Friendly Workplace 
Consider a few of the many illustrations of the power-couple 
phenomenon as the 109th Congress drew to a close in late 2006: 
Senator Elizabeth Dole (R-NC) is married to former Senator Bob 
Dole (R-KS), who now works at Alston & Bird as a registered 
lobbyist with many clients, including the Dubai-owned company 
once set to assume management of six United States seaports.50 
Abigail Blunt, the wife of Representative Roy Blunt (R-MO), once 
the acting House Majority Leader, works as a lobbyist for the Altria 
Group (Philip Morris’s parent company),51 and Ted Stevens (R-AK), 
former chair of the powerful Appropriations Committee, is married to 
Catherine Stevens, a lobbyist at Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw where 
her work has focused on appropriations52 (although her firm denies 
that she lobbies Congress anymore53). Linda Daschle, the wife of 
former Senator Tom Daschle, has long lobbied on behalf of the 
airline industry, among others.54 
The cited examples reveal only the iceberg’s tip. According to one 
list compiled in November 2006,55 twenty-one sitting senators had 
close family members lobbying Congress or working for firms that 
do so, including seven wives, one husband, fourteen sons (plus one 
son-in-law), and two fathers.56 In the House of Representatives, 
eighteen legislators had close family members lobbying Congress 
and/or state legislatures, including five wives, five sons, three 
daughters (plus one daughter-in-law), two brothers, one sister, and 
 
 50. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Role of Senator Dole’s Husband at Issue, WASH. POST, Feb. 
24, 2006, at A6; see also, e.g., Kirkpatrick, supra note 26. 
 51. See Justice, supra note 14. 
 52. Kane & Chappie, supra note 28; Editorial, Family Ties, Cont’d, ROLL CALL (Wash., 
D.C.), Feb. 11, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 4022255.  
 53. See Newmyer, supra note 44. 
 54. Jim Drinkard, Majority Leader Daschle, Lobbyist Wife Vow to Keep Careers 
Separate, USA TODAY, June 5, 2001, http://www.usatoday.com/news/Washington/june01/ 
2001-06-06-daschle-linda.htm. 
 55. See infra app. 1. 
 56. See id. Because our analysis focuses on the 109th Congress, we do not include in our 
count Senator-elect Jim Webb (D-VA), whose ex-wife works as a registered lobbyist, and we 
do include outgoing (now former) Representative Harold Ford, Jr. (D-TN), whose father 
lobbies. More significantly, the prospect of reforms from the very start of the 110th Congress 
probably influenced behavior so that prospective family lobbyists might have decided to “wait 
and see” before making employment decisions. 
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one cousin.57 A compilation from 2007 found sixty-three lawmakers 
in Congress with relatives who have lobbied or consulted on 
government matters recently.58 The lawmakers on these lists include 
some of the most senior and influential members of the 109th 
Congress—with names such as McCain, Hatch, Hastert, and Reid 
appearing in addition to those mentioned above.59 SourceWatch, a 
project of the Center for Media and Democracy, calls these lobbyists 
“Kith & Kin Inc.,” based on a New York Times editorial from 2004.60 
These data raise several noteworthy questions. Beyond the general 
question whether the situations described reveal a problem—be it a 
conflict of interest, evidence of “influence peddling,” inequitable 
access to government, or an appearance of impropriety—more 
particularized questions include whether “the problem” presented by 
spouses is the same as that presented by any of the other close family 
members listed. Also, what of unmarried couples and others who 
escape the labels and hence such lists—despite their intimacy and 
their behavior as functional family members? Finally, what should 
we make of the gender questions, given the prevalence among the 
lobbyists of wives over husbands—and sons over daughters for that 
matter? 
C. The Emergence of the “Political Spouse” 
The phenomenon of family lobbying emerged with the rise of 
wives in the paid workforce.61 According to Donald A. Ritchie, a 
Senate historian, marriages joining lobbyists with lawmakers were 
unheard of several decades ago, but since the 1960s, he said, such 
unions have become more common as the numbers of lobbyists have 
 
 57. Id.; see also Justice, supra note 14. 
 58. Marisa Katz, Family Ties, NAT’L J., Jan. 31, 2007, at 47. 
 59. See infra app. 1; see also Carl Hulse, In Capitol, Last Names Link Some Leaders and 
Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, § 1, at 1 (noting at the time that “relatives of three of the 
four top members of Congress work as lobbyists illustrat[ing] how pervasive and accepted the 
practice has become”). 
 60. See Kith & Kin Inc., http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Kith_%26_Kin_ 
Inc. (last visited June 11, 2007). The name comes from Editorial, Kith & Kin Inc., N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 14, 2004, at A18.  
 61. See Neubauer et al., supra note 16.  
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exploded.62 One report, emphasizing this larger social context, 
contends that the issue first surfaced in 1978, when the Senate Ethics 
Committee was asked whether a spouse could lobby.63 Recalling that 
time, William Canfield, former senior staff counsel to this committee, 
has commented in the Los Angeles Times: 
It would have been easier, cleaner to say: “To hell with a 
changing society. It’s wrong. You can become a plumber. You 
can be anything you want. But you can’t lobby” . . . . “But they 
said she could, and now we’re splitting hairs 25 years later. . . . 
The horse has left the barn.”64 
A few years later, in 1985, the Congressional Management 
Foundation published a guidebook by Marc E. Miller, Politicians and 
Their Spouses’ Careers.65 This slender volume, purportedly designed 
to prevent the embarrassment of the unwelcome public spotlight,66 
assumes that lawmakers and their spouses seek to act in good faith, 
but need an advice manual to avoid being blindsided by the peculiar 
ways of Washington.67 The book acknowledges the gendered reality 
of 1985, namely that “the Members of Congress are usually men, and 
the affected spouses are usually women,”68—a generalization that 
remains accurate now, more than twenty years later,69 
notwithstanding the slowly growing number of female lawmakers.70 
Despite this story of origins, however, a precipitating event for the 
guidebook appears to have been the House inquiry into the exemption 
to the required disclosure of a spouse’s financial interests claimed by 
 
 62. Kirkpatrick, supra note 26. 
 63. Neubauer et al., supra note 16. 
 64. Id. (second ellipsis in original). 
 65. MARC E. MILLER, POLITICIANS AND THEIR SPOUSES’ CAREERS (1985). 
 66. Id. at 14. 
 67. See id. at 40–41. 
 68. Id. at 15. 
 69. Today, an organization of “lawmakers’ spouses,” the Congressional Club, goes by a 
gender-neutral name, but news stories nonetheless refer to it as a “wives club.” See Jonathan E. 
Kaplan, Wives Club Asks $50,000 for Lunch with First Lady, THE HILL (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 31, 
2006, at 1.  
 70. During the 109th Congress, women occupied 138 of the 435 seats in the House of 
Representatives and 14 of the 100 seats in the Senate. In the 110th Congress, the number of 
women in the House declined to 71 but the number in the Senate rose to 16. Thus, men continue 
to predominate in both. 
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the first woman on a presidential ticket, former Representative 
Geraldine Ferraro (D-NJ), the Democratic nominee for Vice 
President of the United States in 1984.71 
Consistent with its premises of good faith and naiveté, the book 
helps clarify why a lawmaker’s spouse might find tempting work as a 
lobbyist. The reasons include: the need for the lawmaker’s family to 
supplement the congressional income;72 the nice fit between a 
lobbyist’s schedule and the perceived necessity of a spouse’s 
participation in periodic re-election campaigns;73 and the constraints 
on a spouse’s official work imposed by both anti-nepotism rules,74 
which limit opportunities for government employment, and the Hatch 
Act,75 which limits political activities. Despite these attractions and 
the absence of rules restricting spousal lobbying,76 the guidebook 
cautions that ethical constraints impose a higher standard,77 that 
appearances matter and demand self-policing,78 and that society 
views a married couple as a single unit, sharing both communication 
and economic benefits.79 
Miller proposed a “smell test” for legislators and their spouses to 
head off any improprieties or appearances thereof.80 The 
 
 71. Miller’s book includes as an appendix an excerpt from the “House Committee on 
Standards of Official Conduct Report on Rep[resentative] Ferraro’s Financial Disclosure.” 
MILLER, supra note 65, at 96–99. 
 72. Id. at 10. 
 73. Id. at 8–10. 
 74. See id. at 9. 
 75. 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (2000) (restricting federal employees’ participation in political 
activities). Thus, the Hatch Act precludes one who takes a federal job from participating in a 
spouse’s re-election campaign. See MILLER, supra note 65, at 11. 
 76. MILLER, supra note 65, at 19. Miller notes that the only rules directly affecting 
spouses require disclosure of financial activities and that these operate primarily as a 
prophylactic, deterring income and gifts that would raise questions once reported. See id. at 24. 
 77. Id. at 19. 
 78. See id. at 23. 
 79. Id. at 20. 
 80. See id. at 39. He writes:  
What we are suggesting is a method of implementing what could be called a “smell 
test”: if it doesn’t smell right, chances are something’s rotten. The smell test may not 
be elegant or precise, but conscientious consideration of . . . [specific] factors . . . 
should give a reasonable indication of whether a particular situation is likely to raise 
troublesome issues in the future. 
Id. 
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recommended multi-factored standard is designed to ferret out job 
opportunities that would make the spouse little more than a conduit to 
the lawmaker or, if exposed, would create embarrassment.81 Yet, as 
one observer has noted, despite the “clichéd test of propriety . . . 
whether the person involved would be comfortable [seeing] an 
activity reported on the front page of the Washington Post[,] having a 
thick skin or, at least, [a] willingness to run risks is an important 
 
 81. See id. at 38–39. The factors listed constitute a series of questions for the spouse to 
ask him- or herself:  
• Are my skills commensurate with the job being discussed? In other words, am I 
being considered for a position because of the talents I can bring and apply to it, or, am 
I being considered for other reasons? If so, what are they? 
• Are the responsibilities of the position reasonably clear, or are they so vague that I 
may find myself responsible for activities which are inappropriate for a Member’s 
spouse? 
• What responsibilities will relate, even indirectly, to my spouse’s position as a 
Member? For example, will I be working with issues involving my spouse’s 
colleagues, and, if so, is it possible that my position (or my spouse’s) will be affected? 
How? 
• Am I comfortable enough with my prospective employer that, once I am hired, it 
would be unlikely that I will be asked to undertake tasks which could present practical 
or ethical dilemmas in view of my role as a congressional spouse? 
• Is the salary offered commensurate with the job described? If it seems high, why is 
this so? 
• Am I being considered for this position primarily because my spouse is a Member of 
Congress? 
• Is this job an appropriate career step for me, irrespective of my spouse’s office? If 
my spouse is no longer in Congress two or four years from now, will this job have 
advanced my own career goals? 
• Can I make a reasonable assessment of how the demands of my job can affect my 
relationship with my spouse? Is it likely to add unacceptable levels of stress or tension 
to our relationship? 
• If I do not perform satisfactorily, will my employer be able to dismiss me, or will that 
be too difficult because I am a congressional spouse? 
• How important for me is the flexibility to have unfettered involvement in my 
spouse’s political career? Will this position offer that flexibility—not only in ethical or 
legal terms, but in allowing me the time to travel to the District, or take time off to 
campaign? 
• Is there likely to be anything about this job that would be embarrassing to me or my 
spouse if it appeared on the front page of the Washington Post, in the home-state 
newspapers, or on the evening news? 
Id.  
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characteristic of politicians.”82 Confirming these reflections, social 
scientists have found that a sense of power increases risk-taking 
behavior.83  
In reality and over time, either the odor threshold rose, or the 
benefits of risk-taking proved more alluring than those of compliance 
with Miller’s “smell test.”84 By 2006 the substantial number of 
lawmakers’ family members who were lobbying made the 
guidebook’s advice sound quaint. Indeed, concerns that a spouse in 
search of a supplementary income might unwittingly find herself the 
focus of unfavorable publicity had been eclipsed by a growing 
awareness of a new norm among influential lawmakers—the 
acquisition of a second (or subsequent) wife who is often a seasoned 
lobbyist in Washington, D.C. In describing this emerging “second 
wives club,” Michelle Cottle wrote in the New Republic that “the 
ultimate congressional trophy wife is herself a political animal, able 
to charm donors, handle the press, and spend an entire cocktail party 
discussing the finer points of last week’s Rules Committee hearing on 
lobbying reform.”85 Two prominent examples of this “club” are the 
second wives of former House Majority Whip Roy Blunt and former 
Senate Majority and Minority Leader Tom Daschle, Abigail Blunt 
and Linda Daschle, both experienced lobbyists at the time of their 
marriages.86 
In place of the “smell test,” the prevailing approach became one 
that might be described as whatever the market—or electorate—will 
 
 82. E–mail from Merton Bernstein, Walter D. Coles Professor Emeritus of Law, 
Washington University School of Law, to Susan Appleton, Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe 
Couzins Professor of Law, Washington University (June 20, 2006, 09:02 CST) (on file with 
author). Professor Bernstein’s experience on Capitol Hill includes service as counsel to the 
United States Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations, legislative 
assistant to United States Senator Wayne Morse, and special counsel to the United States Senate 
Subcommittee on Railroad Retirement, as well as the inaugural director of Washington 
University School of Law’s Congressional and Administrative Law Clinic, which places law 
students in D.C. for a semester in which their work on legislators’ and committees’ staffs and in 
administrative offices earns academic credit. 
 83. See, e.g., Cameron Anderson & Adam D. Galinsky, Power, Optimism, and Risk-
Taking, 36 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 511 (2006).  
 84. See supra note 80. 
 85. Michelle Cottle, Arm Candy, Beltway Style: Second Wives Club, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Aug. 7, 2006, at 16, 16. 
 86. Id. at 18–19. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/9
p 207 Appleton Rimmer book pages.doc  10/2/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  Power Couples  
 
 
223
bear. In general, when lawmakers’ conduct makes them unelectable, 
they usually resign or at least decline to let the voters pass judgment. 
We can find illustrations of these broad conclusions outside the 
context of spousal lobbying in the resignation of DeLay, who vacated 
his seat as of June 10, 2006,87 and the decision not to run in 
November 2006 by Ney, amidst news of the ties of both to 
Abramoff.88 Whether such decisions came from each lawmaker’s 
own assessment or party leaders’ interventions, still one can infer that 
the information disclosed does not merely embarrass the lawmaker 
but rather so compromises his public standing that he is no longer 
politically viable.89 
When the political impact of questionable activities seems less 
certain, however, lawmakers’ risk-taking prevails and they take their 
chances in the political process. Hence, for example, although 
Representative Blunt’s marriage to Altria lobbyist Abigail Blunt 
might not make his district’s voters look askance, it was cited as a 
possible explanation for the Republicans’ selection in 2006 of John 
Boehner (R-OH)—instead of Blunt—as House Majority Leader to fill 
the vacancy created by DeLay’s untimely departure.90 Similarly, 
although cause and effect cannot be determined with certainty, 
former Senate leader Tom Daschle lost his seat to John Thune (R-
SD) in 2004 after a campaign that emphasized, inter alia, alleged 
conflicts of interests created by Linda Daschle’s work as a lobbyist.91  
 
 87. Carl Hulse, DeLay Is Quitting Race and House, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 
2006, at A1. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Consider the case of Representative Mark Foley (R-FL), who quickly left the House in 
2006, once his sexually suggestive messages to congressional pages became public. See, e.g., 
Carl Hulse & Raymond Hernandez, Top G.O.P. Aides Knew in Late ‘05 of E-mail to Page, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, § 1, at 1. The article quotes Foley’s Democratic challenger as saying: 
“It looks to me that it was more important to hold onto a seat and to hold onto power than to 
take care of our children.” Id.  
 90. See, e.g., Rick Klein, GOP Ousts Blunt as Majority Leader, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 3, 
2006, at A2; Michael Kranish, Family Ties Spark Concern in Lobby Debate, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Jan. 28, 2006, at A1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Push to Control Lobbying Produces Unexpected 
Shifts and Alliances, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at A17; Jonathan Weisman, Lobbying Colors 
GOP Leadership Contest: Rivals for DeLay Post No Stranger to K Street, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 
2006, at A1.  
 91. See, e.g., Kane, supra note 28; Jeff Zeleny, Senator Daschle “Target No. 1” for Right 
Wing, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 24, 2003, § 1, at 13.  
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Indeed, one might construe the senators’ surprising decision in 
January 2007 to close their chamber to spousal lobbying as an 
illustration of this dynamic balance between risk-taking, on the one 
hand, and projecting what the public will tolerate, on the other. The 
now conventional wisdom holds that Democrats rode to victory in 
November 2006 in part because voters had become disgusted with the 
prevailing “culture of corruption.”92 With the looming prospect of the 
2008 elections, when the White House as well as Congress will be at 
stake, Democrats undoubtedly felt some pressure to deliver on their 
promises, while Republicans feared the reactions that would ensue if 
they stood in the way.93 Calls for change made inaction too risky and 
smoothed the path even for Senator Vitter’s little-heralded 
amendment. 
D. Familiar Approaches  
The background against which the 2007 reforms developed is 
instructive. In tracing the history of government ethics, many cite 
Watergate as a significant impetus.94 Before that, lawmakers largely 
operated under a simple and informal code of conduct that made 
prevailing norms of general decency the determinants of proper 
behavior. Watergate revealed the inadequacy of reliance on informal 
norms, sparking several different changes, including new rules for 
ethics and lobbying.95 
Such rules fall into four rough categories, with most governing the 
legislator’s conduct and a few governing the conduct of the family 
member lobbyist. Across all four categories, however, appearances 
and perceptions stand out as significant reference points. As one 
ethics expert has written, “We live . . . in an appearance ethics 
 
 92. See Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Ethics Overhaul Tops the Agenda as the 
Democrats Take Over, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007, at A18. 
 93. See John M. Broder, Outgoing Chief Warns G.O.P. on Outlook for 2008 Races, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A19; Kirkpatrick, supra note 34. 
 94. See generally Kathleen Clark, The Legacy of Watergate for Legal Ethics Instruction, 
51 HASTINGS L.J. 673 (2000) (noting how the legal profession responded to the Watergate 
scandal). Some observers describe the action at the start of the 110th Congress as the most 
significant since Watergate. See, e.g., Chaddock, supra note 10.  
 95. See, e.g., Ann McBride, Ethics in Congress: Agenda and Action, 58 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 451, 456 (1990). 
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heyday.”96 The brief summary below attempts to highlight those pre-
2007 regulations pertinent to the power couples whom we are 
examining and the behavior that might raise ethical questions. 
1. Disclosure Requirements 
One familiar set of constraints mandates disclosure. Disclosure 
rules arguably deter possible misconduct and also enable the public to 
judge officials’ behavior, even that which is legal. If the prospect of 
public exposure (having conduct reported “on the front page of the 
Washington Post”97) helps identify unacceptably risky or 
questionable conduct, then disclosure requirements operationalize 
this standard.98 Hence, these requirements prompt those subject to the 
rules to anticipate how the disclosed information will appear to 
others. 
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 imposes on the legislator 
(the “reporting individual”) extensive financial-disclosure obligations 
about his or her own activities and those of a spouse and dependent 
children, including the source of any item of spousal earned income 
that exceeds $100099; gifts to spouses or dependent children other 
than those “received totally independent of the relationship of the 
spouse or dependent child to the reporting individual”100; and income, 
assets, or liabilities valued greater than $1,000,000 if held jointly 
with the reporting individual.101 The law contains an exception for 
items that the reporting individual certifies represent solely the 
spouse’s or dependent child’s financial matter, outside the reporting 
individual’s knowledge, in no way derived from his or her interests, 
and with no anticipated financial benefit to the reporting 
individual.102 
 
 96. Peter W. Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Blifil 
Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. REV. 593, 602–03 (1992). 
 97. See E-mail, supra note 82; see also MILLER, supra note 65, at 39. 
 98. As Miller explains the underlying theory: “Members will likely be sensitive to 
material on the public record which could be interpreted to present the appearance of improper 
behavior.” MILLER, supra note 65, at 24. 
 99.  5 U.S.C. app. 4, § 102(e)(1)(A) (2000).  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. § 102(e)(1)(F). 
 102. Id. § 102 (e)(1)(E). It was this exception that former Representative Geraldine Ferraro 
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2. Gift Restrictions and Imputation Rules 
At one time, the Senate had a ban on gifts exceeding the value of 
$100 that applied alike to the lawmaker and the spouse or 
dependent.103 But, for spouses and dependents, this rule defined 
“gift” to exclude anything provided “by the employer of such spouse 
or dependent in recognition of the service provided by such spouse or 
dependent.”104 Miller asserted that this exception creates uncertainties 
for spouses who work as lobbyists.105 He thus implied that such work 
always raises a question whether the lobbyist is providing a service, 
apart from her relationship with (and thus access to) the lawmaker. 
Gift-giving regulations have evolved over time. During the 109th 
Congress, a lawmaker could accept a gift so long as its value was less 
than $50.106 The restrictions have not automatically applied to gifts to 
spouses. Nonetheless, a gift to a lawmaker’s family member may 
count against the limit if the lawmaker has reason to believe the gift 
was given because of his or her official position.107 In other words, 
the rules impute a gift to the lawmaker when the lawmaker has the 
required state of mind. On the other hand, a lawmaker’s spouse has 
been able to accept any gift—without imputation to the lawmaker—
when the gift is unrelated to the lawmaker’s position.108 
 
invoked in an effort to disassociate herself from any scandal involving her husband’s business 
dealings, in turn prompting an inquiry by the House Committee on Standards of Official 
Conduct. See MILLER, supra note 65, at 96–99. 
 103. MILLER, supra note 65, at 28–29 (summarizing the then-current version of Senate 
Rule XXXV).  
 104. Id. at 29.  
 105. Id. 
 106. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, U.S. SENATE, SENATE ETHICS MANUAL 22 (2003) 
(summarizing Rule XXXV). For the full text of the Rule, see id. at 314–19. Hereinafter, 
citations to this version of the Senate Rules refer to this manual. In the 110th Congress, the 
House changed the rule to prohibit a lawmaker from knowingly accepting any gift from a 
registered lobbyist or entity employing registered lobbyists. H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. § 203(a) 
(2007); see infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 107. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, supra note 106, at 314 (Senate Rule XXXV, cl. 
1(b)(2)(A)); House Rule XXV, cl. 5(a)(2)(B)(i), available at http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/ 
rules/ rule25.html. 
 108. There are no additional restrictions on gifts to spouses, other than the imputation rule 
for gifts reasonably believed prompted by the lawmaker’s position. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, 
supra note 106, at 56; see also id. at 315 (Senate Rule XXXV, cl. 1(c)(7)(A) governing food, 
refreshments, lodging, and other benefits); House Rule XXV, cl. 5(a)(3)(G)(i), available at 
http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/rules/ rule25.html. A previous version of the Senate Rule 
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Appearances animate this rule, which determines imputation on 
the basis of the (possibly differing) perceptions of a gift’s purpose on 
the part of the lawmaker, the spouse, and the donor. Further, because 
the restriction on gifts to lawmakers exempts gifts from relatives and 
gifts based on personal friendship,109 the rule fails to address the 
appearances that emerge from marriages in which one spouse serves 
as a lawmaker and the other works as a lobbyist.110 Indeed, these 
exemptions remain despite the otherwise strict new rule banning gifts 
from lobbyists, adopted by the House during the first one hundred 
hours of the 110th Congress.111  
3. Conflict of Interest Rules 
Several different rules anticipate possible conflicts of interests that 
lawmakers might face. Of course, criminal laws prohibit bribery of 
public officials.112 The federal criminal statute on financial conflicts 
of interest, which mentions spouses, addresses employees and 
officers of the executive branch and of independent federal agencies, 
 
asked whether the gift was given in recognition of service by the lawmaker’s spouse. See 
MILLER, supra note 65, at 29. Further, when the lawmaker and spouse are dining guests, the 
cost of the spouse’s meal is not imputed to the lawmaker so long as the lawmaker’s meal costs 
less than fifty dollars. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, supra note 106, at 314 (Senate Rule XXXV, 
cl. 1(b)(2)(B)); House Rule XXV, cl. 5(a)(2)(B)(ii), available at http://clerk.house.gov/legisAct/ 
legisProc/rules/rule25.html. 
 109. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, supra note 106, at 314 (Senate Rule XXXV, cl. 1(c)(3) & 
(4)); House Rule XXV cl. 5(a)(3)(C) & (D), available at http://clerk.house.gov/legisAct/ 
legisProc/rules/rule25.html. A recently passed amendment to the Colorado constitution goes 
further, placing restrictions on gifts from lobbyists, even if the lobbyist is a family member of 
the lawmaker. See Bill Scanlan & April Washington, Critics Laud Ethics but Warn of 
Proposal’s Impact, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Nov. 8, 2006, at A14 (reporting 
that voters “overwhelmingly” supported the “Ethics in Government” amendment); Editorial, A 
Draconian Measure in the Name of Ethics: Dangerous Overkill in Amendment 41, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Oct. 2, 2006, at A38. 
 110. According to Miller, registered lobbyists and their agents are deemed to have a direct 
interest in legislation before Congress. MILLER, supra note 65, at 32. Although Miller cites this 
point to raise questions about gifts that a lawmaker’s spouse might receive from lobbyists, it 
also raises interesting questions about spouses who themselves are registered lobbyists. Indeed, 
these exemptions remain despite the otherwise strict new ban on gifts from lobbyists included 
in the House Rules for the 110th Congress. See H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. §§ 201, 203 (2007). 
The Senate took similar action. S. 1, 110th Cong. § 108 (2007) (passage of similar rules in the 
Senate). 
 111. See H.R. Res. 6, §§ 201, 203. 
 112. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2000). 
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but does not cover legislators.113 Nonetheless, under congressional 
rules, a lawmaker may not receive any compensation, nor permit any 
compensation to accrue to his or her beneficial interest, as a result of 
“influence improperly exerted from his [or her] position.”114 
According to Miller, these measures—designed to prevent influence 
peddling—implicate spouses, who might serve as conduits for efforts 
to sway members of Congress.115  
Again, appearances play a critical role because of the widely 
shared views, discussed below, that spouses pool their incomes and 
that marriage imposes a financial partnership,116 suggesting that 
payments to a spouse, even as salary, might be imputed to the 
lawmaker. Further, the rules’ trigger—“improperly exerted” 
influence—requires a judgment call based on prevailing perceptions 
and norms, given the uncertain boundary between the proper and the 
improper.117 
In addition, a senator cannot knowingly advance legislation  
a principal purpose of which is to further only his pecuniary 
interest, only the pecuniary interest of his immediate family, or 
only the pecuniary interest of a limited class of persons or 
enterprises, when he, or his immediate family, or enterprises 
controlled by them, are members of the affected class.118 
The rule’s narrow language offers much leeway, permitting 
legislation with a purpose (although not “a principal purpose” or the 
“only” purpose) to advance personal, familial, or other special 
interests.119 
 
 113. Id. § 208; see also Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: 
An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 88–89.  
 114. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, supra note 106, at 321 (Senate Rule XXXVII, cl. 1); 
House Rule XXIII cl. 3, available at http://clerk.house.gov/legisAct/legisProc/rules/ 
rule23.html.  
 115. See MILLER, supra note 65, at 29–30 (quoting columnist Jack Anderson, who 
criticized “‘making payments to a politician’s spouse’ as ‘a new form of the old Washington 
game of influence buying’”).  
 116. See infra note 151–55 and accompanying text. 
 117. See MILLER, supra note 65, at 29, 31. 
 118. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, supra note 106, at 321 (Senate Rule XXXVII cl. 4); see 
MILLER, supra note 65, at 30. 
 119. Referring to the Senate Rules, Professor Clark observes that “[a]s long as legislation 
affects the financial interests of others, a senator may help pass legislation which also affects 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/9
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The House has approached this issue first through a rule 
exempting a representative from the obligation to vote when “he has 
a direct personal or pecuniary interest in such question.”120 According 
to Miller, representatives rarely decline to vote under this 
disqualification, which remains a matter for the exercise of personal 
discretion.121 In addition, the House Ethics Manual provides general 
guidance with respect to conflicts of interest, defining “conflict of 
interest” to “denote a situation in which an official’s conduct of his 
office conflicts with his private economic affairs,” because the 
“ultimate concern” is the “risk of impairment of impartial 
judgment.”122 Accepting benefits that reasonable persons might 
construe as influencing the performance of official duties “would 
raise the appearance of undue influence or breach of the public 
 
her own personal financial interest.” Clark, supra note 113, at 89. 
 120. House Rule III cl. 1, available at http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleproc/110th.pdf; see 
MILLER, supra note 65, at 33. 
 121. MILLER, supra note 65, at 33. Miller refers to the manual prepared by Thomas 
Jefferson when he presided over the Senate as Vice President of the United States. This manual 
unambiguously and more broadly disqualifies one from voting whenever “the private interests 
of a Member are concerned.” Id. Professor Clark notes that, as the result of permissive rules, 
“members of Congress sometimes play key roles in passing or blocking legislation that has a 
direct impact on their investments.” Clark, supra note 113, at 89. 
 122. COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, ETHICS MANUAL FOR MEMBERS, 
OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ch. 3 (1992), available 
at http://www.house.gov/ethics/ethicschap3.html (“Outside Employment and Income of 
Members, Officers, Employees, and Spouses”). The language quoted in text appears in this 
context: 
Although the term “conflict of interest” may be subject to various interpretations in 
general usage, under Federal law and regulation, this term “is limited in meaning; it 
denotes a situation in which an official’s conduct of his office conflicts with his private 
economic affairs.” The ultimate concern, “then, is risk of impairment of impartial 
judgment, a risk which arises whenever there is temptation to serve personal interests.”  
 In addition to statutory restraints limiting particular types and amounts of outside 
income, general ethical standards and rules restrict any outside activities that are 
inconsistent with congressional responsibilities. The Code of Ethics for Government 
Service[] affirms that a “public office is a public trust” and cautions all Government 
officials not to engage in any business with the Government, “either directly or 
indirectly, which is inconsistent with the conscientious performance” of governmental 
duties. This Code specifically provides that a Member or employee should never 
accept “benefits under circumstances which might be construed by reasonable persons 
as influencing the performance” of official duties. To do so would raise the appearance 
of undue influence or breach of the public trust.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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trust.”123 The Manual explains that this appearance-based standard 
“accord[s] with other professional standards,” such as an attorney’s 
obligation to “avoid even the appearance of professional 
impropriety.”124  
4. Restrictions on Spousal Lobbying 
The rules canvassed above govern legislators. Until the 110th 
Congress, pronouncements aimed at legislators’ spouses or family 
members were few and far between, with restrictions regarding their 
lobbying especially scarce. According to the once controlling Senate 
Ethics Manual: “[T]he decision on whether a spouse may lobby the 
Senate is generally a decision for the Senator and his or her spouse, 
giving due regard to the potential reflection upon the Senate.”125 This 
Senate Ethics Manual goes on to refer back to the conflict-of-interest 
limits and other restrictions applicable to the legislator: although 
spousal employment gives rise to compensation accruing indirectly to 
the senator’s beneficial interest, no violation of Senate rules arises 
“unless the Member has improperly exerted influence or performed 
official acts in order to obtain compensation for or as a result of 
compensation to the spouse.”126 In addition, disclosure of a spouse’s 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. The language quoted in text appears in this context:  
Such restrictions accord with other professional standards, which may apply to 
particular Members and employees. For example, Canon 9 of the American Bar 
Association (ABA) Model Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers cautions 
that “[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.” 
Id. 
 125. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, supra note 106, at 93. 
 126. Id. The language quoted in text appears in this context: 
 Neither federal law nor Senate rules specifically preclude a Member’s spouse from 
engaging in any activity on the ground that it could create a conflict of interest with the 
Member’s official duties. However, Senate rules and statutory provisions impute to the 
Member certain benefits that are received by the spouse. Thus the question may arise 
as to whether the Member is improperly benefiting as a result of the spouse’s 
employment. 
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earned income is required,127 as noted earlier. Finally, the Senate 
Ethics Manual contains a hortatory reminder: “Given the heightened 
public interest in the professional activities of spouses of Members, 
the Committee hopes that spouses, as well as Members, will conduct 
their professional and business activities so as not to reflect adversely 
upon the Senate as an institution.”128  
This language emphasizes the Senate’s collective institutional 
image,129 a focus that is absent from the House’s approach. 
Nonetheless, like the Senate’s approach, the House Ethics Manual 
leaves much wiggle room that eventually yields an appearance-based 
standard. The House Manual provides that the “mere potential of a 
conflict of interest” does not preclude spousal employment, that no 
 
 Senate Rule 37, paragraph 1, part of the Code of Official Conduct, prohibits a 
Member from receiving any compensation, or allowing any compensation to accrue to 
the Member’s beneficial interest, from any source as a result of an improper exercise 
of official influence. The income received by a spouse from employment usually 
accrues, albeit indirectly, to a Member’s interest. Nonetheless, this provision is not 
triggered by a spouse’s employment unless the Member has improperly exerted 
influence or performed official acts in order to obtain compensation for or as a result 
of compensation to the spouse.  
Id. 
 127. Id. The language quoted in text appears in this context: 
 Standing Rule 34 (Public Financial Disclosure), requires a Senator to disclose the 
source of any earned income in excess of $1,000 received by a spouse. The Committee 
has recognized that the compensated employment of spouses is a matter of interest to 
the public. Thus, in Interpretative Ruling No. 336 (Sept. 5, 1980), the Committee 
stated its view that a Senator’s spouse’s lobbying on behalf of a corporation on whose 
board the spouse served, might, under certain circumstances, reflect adversely upon 
the Senate as an institution.  
Id.  
 128. Id. The language quoted in text appears in this context: 
In Interpretative Ruling No. 397 (May 24, 1985), the Committee found that no rule of 
the Senate prohibited the spouse of a Senator from accepting compensated 
employment with a tax-exempt educational organization where the spouse’s 
responsibilities were to be focused on educational activities for the public rather than 
lobbying the Congress. A spouse may, of course, supervise others who lobby the 
Senate. As noted, compensated spousal employment must be disclosed by the Senator 
on the annual financial disclosure statement. Given the heightened public interest in 
the professional activities of spouses of Members, the Committee hopes that spouses, 
as well as Members, will conduct their professional and business activities so as not to 
reflect adversely upon the Senate as an institution.  
Id.  
 129. See supra notes 125, 128 and accompanying text. 
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specific prohibition addresses spousal behavior that might create a 
conflict of interest, and that officials should “never . . . accept 
benefits for themselves or their families ‘under circumstances that 
might be construed by reasonable persons as influencing the 
performance’ of official duties.”130 
II. APPEARANCES OF MARRIAGE 
A. Family Law’s Two Minds About Marriage 
The pivotal role that appearances have played in determining the 
outer limits of permissible behavior by lawmakers and lobbyists calls 
for an exploration of our contemporary understanding of marriage. 
How do we generally think about married couples today? To what 
extent does this understanding rest on legal rules and constructions? 
More specifically, what appearances do power couples generate? 
 
 130. COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 122. The language quoted 
in text appears in this context: 
The mere potential of a conflict of interest does not preclude a Member’s spouse from 
accepting outside employment. However, Members should avoid circumstances 
suggesting that they receive direct or indirect benefits that influence official acts.  
. . . .  
 Neither Federal law nor House rules specifically precludes a Member’s spouse from 
engaging in any activity on the ground that it could create a conflict of interest with the 
Member’s official duties. However, House rules and statutory provisions impute to the 
Member certain benefits that are received by the spouse. Thus the question may arise 
as to whether the Member is improperly benefiting as a result of the spouse’s 
employment.  
 House Rule 43, clause 3, part of the Code of Official Conduct, prohibits a Member 
from receiving any compensation, or allowing any compensation to accrue to the 
Member’s beneficial interest, from any source as a result of an improper exercise of 
official influence. Additionally, the Code of Ethics for Government Service (para. 5) 
admonishes officials never to accept benefits for themselves or their families “under 
circumstances which might be construed by reasonable persons as influencing the 
performance” of official duties. The income received by a spouse from employment 
usually accrues, albeit indirectly, to a Member’s interest. Nonetheless, neither of these 
provisions is triggered by a spouse’s employment unless the Member has improperly 
exerted influence or performed official acts either in order to obtain compensation for 
or as a result of compensation to the spouse.  
Id. 
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An analysis of appearances in the context of marriage presents 
nothing new. Historically, holding out as married or “acting married” 
constituted an essential element for establishing the existence of a 
marriage at common law.131 Yet, the meaning or message conveyed 
by such actions, as well as by formal marriage itself, while never 
constant, has become even more elusive—with activists on both sides 
of the same-sex marriage debate contesting marriage’s essential 
ingredients,132 with single-adult households and marriage-like 
relationships eclipsing traditional marriages,133 and with scholars 
recommending more flexibility even for traditional couples.134  
Professor Stephanie Coontz demonstrates the absence of a single, 
universal understanding of marriage, asserting that even the key 
ingredients of sexual activity and economic cooperation do not 
characterize all marriages.135 Further, the concept of marriage has 
dramatically changed over the years, evolving from a mechanism for 
political alliances to a personal commitment based on love.136 Even 
modern times have witnessed transitions in the meaning of marriage, 
as lived and experienced.137 Indeed, one contemporary debate 
concerns whether marriage, as experienced, entails such gender-
 
 131. See, e.g., Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 957 (2000) (explaining how the doctrine of common law marriage emphasized 
whether a couple “acted married”); see also Winfield v. Renfro, 821 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App. 
1991). 
 132. See supra note 5. 
 133. See Sam Roberts, 51% of Women Are Now Living Without Spouse, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
16, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter Roberts, 51%]; Sam Roberts, It’s Official: To Be Married Means to 
Be Outnumbered, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, § 1, at 22 [hereinafter Roberts, It’s Official]. 
 134. See, e.g., James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875 (2000); 
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 
CAL. L. REV. 204 (1982); Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to 
Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1479 (2001); cf. Linda C. McClain, Family 
Constitutions and the (New) Constitution of the Family, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 833 (2006). 
 135. STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR HOW 
LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 26–27 (2005). On the evolving understanding of marriage in the 
United States, see NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 
(2000).  
 136. See generally COONTZ, supra note 135. 
 137. See THEODORE CAPLOW ET AL., MIDDLETOWN FAMILIES: FIFTY YEARS OF CHANGE 
AND CONTINUITY 116–35 (1982) (describing experiences of marriage in “Middletown” in the 
1920s, 1930s, and 1970s); see also THEODORE CAPLOW ET AL., THE FIRST MEASURED 
CENTURY: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO TRENDS IN AMERICA, 1900–2000, at 68 (2000) 
(discussing marriage rates). 
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based differences that married men enjoy measurable mental health 
benefits while the mental and emotional health of married women 
suffers.138 
Some scholars have suggested frank recognition of several 
different marriage regimes, designed to reflect the diversity among 
modern (or postmodern) families.139 Perhaps, then, it should come as 
no surprise that in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,140 
which held unconstitutional the exclusion of same-sex couples from 
marriage and its benefits, a majority of the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts chose particularly open-ended definitional language: 
“We construe civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of two 
persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others.”141 The court’s 
language shifts the focus from the meaning of “marriage” to the 
meaning of “spouses,” leaving at large just what this spousal 
relationship entails.142 
Despite this fluid and pluralistic understanding of “marriage” and 
“spouses,” modern family law’s rhetoric has unequivocally made 
gender equality a salient value. Transforming a set of rules that once 
unapologetically subordinated women143 and confined them to the 
private sphere,144 the United States Supreme Court has rejected 
gender-based roles and stereotypes for husbands and wives.145 Most 
recently, in examining protected workplace leaves for family care, 
 
 138. See JESSIE BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 16–18, 26–28, 40–42, 49–50 
(1982). But see LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY 
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 162–63 (2001). 
 139. See supra note 134. 
 140. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 141. Id. at 969. 
 142. Of course, Goodridge notes the numerous government benefits triggered by marriage. 
Id. at 955–57. But even this collection of benefits does not communicate clearly and 
consistently what precisely it means to be married or to unite as spouses. 
 143. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *442 (“By marriage, the husband and wife 
are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended 
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated or consolidated into that of the husband . . . .”). 
 144. The classic statement appears in Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion in Bradwell v. 
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139–42 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).  
 145. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 
(1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See generally Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in 
Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 97, 110–15 (2005). 
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the Court has embraced official efforts to disrupt “mutually 
reinforcing stereotypes creat[ing] a self-fulfilling cycle of 
discrimination that [forces] women to continue to assume the role of 
primary family caregiver, and [that fosters] employers’ stereotypical 
views about women’s commitment to work and their value as 
employees.”146 To the extent, then, that marriage is “the vehicle 
through which the apparatus of state can shape the gender order,”147 
as historian Nancy Cott has written, the language of equal 
opportunity brands today’s official model. 
Against this background, two primary cross-currents shape the 
concept of marriage in contemporary family law—each with 
significant implications for reforms aimed at power couples. On the 
one hand, numerous recent developments have elevated the 
individual identity of each spouse over earlier notions that a married 
couple constitutes a single, indivisible unit. For example, old rules of 
interspousal immunity and spousal evidentiary privileges have given 
way to analyses that emphasize the separate interests of each 
spouse.148 Similarly, in striking down a spousal notice requirement 
for abortion, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the common law 
understanding of marriage in favor of an understanding based on 
individual rights.149 And even the rise of unilateral no-fault divorce 
sends the message that membership in a family does not divest the 
individual of his or her autonomy, including exit rights.150 
Despite modern family law’s clear focus on the individual, 
another transformation arguably cuts the other way. An 
understanding of marriage as a partnership, resting on the 
contributions of each spouse to the joint enterprise, now drives the 
financial consequences of dissolution.151 In addition to those 
 
 146. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003). 
 147. COTT, supra note 135, at 3. 
 148. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (deciding that witness spouse 
alone can invoke privilege against adverse spousal testimony); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 
651 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (abrogating interspousal immunity). 
 149. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896–97 (1992); see also 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“[T]he marital couple is not an independent 
entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a 
separate intellectual and emotional makeup.”). 
 150. Cf. Wilson, supra note 20. 
 151. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 20, at 
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jurisdictions that follow a community property regime both during 
the marriage and after its end,152 even common law states now have 
equitable distribution laws that reflect a deferred-community 
approach to dividing property upon divorce. Under these laws, the 
breadwinning spouse’s earnings during the marriage constitute 
marital property to be divided equitably between both spouses at 
dissolution.153 And, although based on different theoretical 
foundations, post-dissolution support (often known as alimony or 
maintenance) also frequently takes into account sharing principles 
under which marriage is conceptualized as a partnership.154 These 
developments find reinforcement in notions of economic unity, 
sharing, and partnership that underlie the treatment of married 
couples by federal income tax law, for example.155 
Professor Milton Regan explored aspects of these competing 
regimes in his 1999 book, Alone Together: Law and the Meanings of 
Marriage.156 Positing “moments in marriage” when a spouse assumes 
either an “external stance” or an “internal stance,” Regan seeks to 
establish that “controversies over the legal regulation of marriage can 
be seen as conflicts over the relative weight that should attach to each 
vision in a particular context.”157 In other words, according to Regan, 
in some contexts the external stance predominates (defined as 
 
21–23 (presenting a general description of the prevailing approach to division of property upon 
dissolution of marriage); Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or 
Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227. 
 152. Nine states have community property laws. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN 
FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 238–39 & n.7 (3d ed. 
2006) (Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and 
Wisconsin). 
 153. See generally BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 1.02 (2d 
ed. 1994 & Supp. 2004). Although this approach was designed to address the inequities 
experienced by spouses who do not work outside the home, in modern marriages with two 
breadwinners each acquires a stake in the other’s earnings to be realized upon dissolution. 
 154. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 20, at 785–
906 (Chapter 5 on “Compensatory Spousal Payments”). 
 155.  See, e.g., Shari Motro, A New “I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 1509 (2006). 
 156. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE 
(1999). 
 157. Id. at 5. The three specific contexts that Regan examines are attempts to apply 
economic analysis to marriage and divorce, spousal evidentiary privileges, and the financial 
consequences of marital dissolution. Id. 
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“represent[ing] an individual’s capacity to reflect critically upon, 
rather than simply identify with, her commitments and 
attachments”158). But in other contexts, the internal stance tips the 
scales (defined as the perspective of a spouse from “‘inside’ the 
marriage as a participant who accepts its claims” and “from which 
marriage appears as a universe of shared meaning that serves as the 
taken-for-granted background for individual conduct”159). 
For the power couple, the first story about contemporary marriage 
or Regan’s “external stance”—emphasizing individual identity and 
interests—would suggest that each spouse should remain free to do 
his or her “own thing,” regardless of the career of the other. Even in 
the context of business, industry, and many professions, this 
understanding has been gaining ground, often for very practical and 
self-regarding reasons. Consider, for example, the decline of anti-
nepotism policies: Once, employers thought such restrictions would 
check the hiring of unqualified workers, improve efficiency, and 
reduce conflicts in the workplace; today, as the result of the 
prevalence of two-career couples, some employers find that 
recruiting and hiring both spouses can provide an advantage in the 
marketplace.160 In short, we have become accustomed to spouses 
with not only their own careers but also intersecting or overlapping 
employment orbits.  
This first story reflects the view of the power couple that 
flourished at least through the end of the 109th Congress. According 
to this story, when one spouse is elected to Congress and moves to 
Washington, D.C., the other spouse—increasingly with a career of 
his or her own—often follows; alternatively, two individuals with 
 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. 
 160. Anti-nepotism policies have decreased in a number of employment settings, largely 
because employers now consider them disadvantageous. See, e.g., Deborah J. Anderson, 
Academic Couples: Problems and Promises, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 156 (1999) 
(reviewing ACADEMIC COUPLES: PROBLEMS AND PROMISES (Marianne A. Ferber & Jane W. 
Loeb eds., 1997), and noting increase in faculty couples); David Margolick, The Law: At the 
Bar, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1988, at B8 (reporting growing number of marriages between 
lawyers practicing in the same firm and the weakening of traditional anti-nepotism restrictions). 
But cf. Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2001). Nonetheless, an 
anti-nepotism statute still prohibits federal legislators from hiring their relatives. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 3110 (2000).  
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careers in D.C. meet and marry.161 As Linda Daschle, an experienced 
aviation lobbyist at the time of her marriage to former Senator 
Majority and Minority Leader Tom Daschle, has remarked:  
I think a congressional spouse is entitled to a career, self-
fulfillment. I love what I do. I love aviation. I love aviation 
policy. I don’t see myself walking away from a career that I’ve 
invested nearly 25 years in.162 
In other words, according to this story, the predominant 
appearance generated by the power couple is that of two independent 
professionals who happen to be married to one another. Further, this 
view is purportedly linked to a commitment to gender equality 
because the emergence of individual autonomy in marriage represents 
a rejection of patriarchal family laws163 and because employment 
restrictions based on marriage often penalize the wife.164 
At the same time, however, the second understanding of modern 
marriage or Regan’s “internal stance”—emphasizing unity and 
partnership—evokes criticisms of power couples. The quip quoted 
earlier, “How can a member of Congress possibly share a bed and a 
bank account with a member of the persuasion industry without a life 
laced by conflicts of interest?,”165 encapsulates this perception. From 
this vantage point, power couples appear first as couples, with their 
marital relationship necessarily casting a shadow over their 
interwoven careers. In fact, some critics go further, suggesting that 
these lobbyists acquire their positions only because of their family 
ties to the legislature.166  
 
 161. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 26. 
 162. Stephanie Mencimer, Tom Daschle’s Hillary Problem, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan.–Feb. 
2002 (quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/ 
2001/0201.mencimer.html. 
 163. A nice summary appears in the opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896–97 (1992). See also Appleton, supra note 145, at 
110–15.  
 164. See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for 
Title VII Protection, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (2000); Joan G. Wexler, Husbands and Wives: The 
Uneasy Case for Antinepotism Rules, 62 B.U. L. REV. 75 (1982). 
 165. Justice, supra note 14. 
 166. Neubauer et al., supra note 16; see supra text accompanying note 16. 
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Senator Vitter’s critique of spousal lobbying exemplifies this 
second view of the power couple. As he announced in a press release 
describing his amendment to the Senate’s ethics bill:  
“Using your office to increase your income is a fundamental 
problem at the heart of this [ethics] debate. Special interests 
that employ a senator’s spouse pay large sums of money 
directly into that senator’s family bank account. This 
amendment puts an end to that loophole so it can’t be abused,” 
Vitter said.167 
Between these two stylized descriptions of how power couples 
might “appear” lies a continuum with many intermediate points. 
Under a standard based on avoiding appearances of impropriety, in 
the absence of empirical investigation designed to assess public 
perceptions of power couples168 and given the tensions built into the 
legal construction of marriage today, power couples have been 
enjoying the best of both worlds—an opportunity both reflected in 
and facilitated by the absence of any clear external limits in the 
statutes and ethical rules. Put differently, any uncertainty about 
whether a lobbyist spouse works as an independent individual or 
whether her marriage to a legislator gives her special clout and access 
(in turn making her a particularly valuable, and hence well-paid, 
lobbyist) emerges as simply one example of the many inconsistencies 
that seem to pervade our understanding of modern marriage, 
including its treatment by family law. If we have been unsure 
whether power couples appear to be doing anything improper, the 
reason is that our contemporary conceptualization of marriage is 
riddled with many such ambiguities and contradictions. 
In contrast, Senator Vitter’s approach reflects a very unambiguous 
understanding of marriage, but one that purports to acknowledge 
some differences among power couples. Thus, despite its treatment of 
 
 167. Press Release, Senator David Vitter, Vitter Wins Coburn Support for Morganza to the 
Gulf Project (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://vitter.senate.gov/?module=PressRoom/ 
PressItems&ID=4aa5fa95-8816-4295-a796-610ded40ae96. 
 168. We found one USA Today poll, but it considers only the narrow question of 
lawmakers’ contacts with lobbyists in their own families. See Peter Eisler & Matt Kelley, 
Public Wary of Links with Lobbyists; In Poll, 80% Say It’s Wrong for Relatives to Lobby 
Lawmakers, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 2006, at A1. 
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spouses as a unit, the exception applicable to those spouses who 
worked as lobbyists at least a year before marriage to a senator or 
before the senator’s election169 reflects a conclusion that these 
spouses are deemed bona fide and sufficiently independent to 
continue their work.  
Senator Vitter’s approach might also signal a departure from an 
expansive appearance-based standard for government ethics generally 
and spousal lobbying in particular. One can read Senator Vitter’s 
move to say that he has found a substantive problem, so spousal 
lobbying ought to be prohibited regardless how such activities appear 
to the public. Alternatively, Senator Vitter has suggested that he 
speaks for the public, which has discerned problematic appearances 
in power couples’ activities.170  
B. A Critical Look at Power Couples’ Own Responses 
The contemporary construction of marriage provides a lens 
through which to examine the practices and norms developed over 
the years by power couples, who fashioned their own limits under an 
appearance-based standard that allowed considerable flexibility.171 At 
the time of this writing, the chances that Senator Vitter’s amendment, 
with its rigid restrictions, will become law remain uncertain.172 If the 
amendment becomes law, however, then it will have a significant 
impact on behavior, and these earlier norms and practices will 
become part of the history leading to its enactment. If it does not 
become law, then these norms and practices might, for good or for ill, 
become models for future conduct of power couples. In this section, 
we interrogate these responses developed by some power couples 
themselves to set the stage for our closer look at possible reforms. 
 
 169. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Interview, supra note 10 (“It is a no-brainer to the American people. . . . [T]he 
good news on my spousal lobbying amendment is that it got in because of the public pressure 
and debate.”). 
 171. See infra app. 2 (listing congressional power couples and their self-imposed 
restrictions; compiled at the end of the 109th Congress); see also infra app. 3 
 172. Senator Vitter himself has conceded this point in an interview. Interview, supra note 
10; see Sullivan, supra note 11; supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. 
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Usually, power couples’ practices and norms have entailed self-
imposed limits on the lobbyist spouse’s activities. For example, 
former Senator Daschle’s wife claimed to have voluntarily limited 
her lobbying to the House alone, because of her husband’s Senate 
leadership position.173 Representative Blunt’s wife has stated that she 
lobbies only the Senate, not the House, given her husband’s position 
as Republican Whip.174 Although some observers point out that the 
individuals in question have not consistently followed these self-
imposed limits,175 would adherence to such standards suffice to cure 
at least the problematic “appearances”? Suppose a senator receives a 
call that Representative Blunt’s wife would like to make an 
appointment to discuss a tobacco issue. Should we presume that a 
senator would react differently from a member of the House? Does 
the problem underlying the “appearance” test persist?176 After all, 
senators and representatives must work together to get legislation 
enacted and to agree on statutory language,177 and these realities raise 
questions about whether the self-imposed limits go far enough. 
Further, appearances might well vary depending on the details. 
Taken seriously, an appearance-based standard might invite 
distinctions based on the position, jurisdiction, and sphere of 
influence of each spouse, the timing of the marriage, and the way the 
spouses present themselves. To what extent do the leadership roles of 
former Senator Daschle (past Majority and Minority Leader) and 
Representative Blunt (once Majority, now Minority Whip) suggest a 
different set of limits from those that might suffice for other 
 
 173. See Drinkard, supra note 54. 
 174. Pamela Brogan, Blunt’s Tobacco Stance Highlights Haziness of Ethics Rules, 
GANNETT NEWS SERV., Mar. 30, 2004; see Justice, supra note 14. 
 175. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics (CREW) in Washington contends that Blunt 
attempted to insert a provision benefiting Philip Morris, at competitors’ expense, in homeland 
security legislation. Press Release, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., CREW 
Reveals Newest Majority Leader—Representative Blunt One of the Most Unethical Members 
of Congress, CREW, Sept. 29, 2005, available at http://www.citizensforethics.org/node/19081; 
see also Jim VandeHei, GOP Whip Quietly Tried to Aid Big Donor, WASH. POST, June 11, 
2003, at A1. Linda Daschle’s name showed up on a list of Senate lobbyists working on behalf 
of a drug company seeking a patent extension on one of its products. Kane, supra note 28. 
 176. Senator Michael Castle (R-DE) suggested a similar concern on the floor of the House. 
153 CONG. REC. H5770 (daily ed. May 24, 2007). 
 177. See e.g., House Rule XXII (“House and Senate Relations”), available at 
http://clerk.house.gov/legisAct/legisProc/rules/rule22.html. 
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lawmakers? Similarly, should the work of Catherine Stevens as a 
lobbyist on appropriations matters for Mayer, Brown, Rowe & 
Maw178 while her husband Senator Ted Stevens chaired the Senate 
Appropriations Committee from 1997 to 2005 raise questions that 
would not arise for a lobbyist with a different focus or a lawmaker on 
a different committee? Although the media publicized criticisms of 
Stevens’ financial activities, his wife’s work as a lobbyist went 
largely unnoticed, so the Stevenses remained impervious.179 
Moreover, do the (second) marriages of Blunt and Daschle to women 
with previously established lobbying careers differentiate these cases 
from those in which the lobbying begins only after the spouse’s 
election, as Senator Vitter’s amendment suggests? 
Some practices seem problematic because they fuel perceptions 
that lobbyists married to legislators have an unfair advantage over 
“ordinary” lobbyists180 and thus provide unequal access for their 
clients. Some who voice this concern contend that even the spousal 
lobbyists’ names cause unfairness, noting that nearly all lobbyist 
spouses have chosen to share the surname of the lawmaker spouse.181 
(At the end of the 109th Congress, the only exceptions were Lucy 
Calautti, wife of Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND), and Allison Lee, wife 
of Representative Maurice Hinchey (D-NY).) Similar concerns arise 
from other, little-known practices, such as Linda Daschle’s display of 
a large framed Senate insigne in her office182 and her firm’s emphasis 
on her ability to report “insider intelligence.”183 Further, consider the 
 
 178. But see supra note 53 and accompanying text (noting denials that Catherine Stevens 
lobbies Congress). 
 179. See, e.g., Chuck Neubauer & Richard T. Cooper, Senator’s Way to Wealth Was Paved 
with Favors, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2003, at A1; Watchdog Group Files Complaint Against 
Stevens, CONGRESS DAILY (Wash., D.C.), Oct. 31, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 13640123. 
 180. See Kranish, supra note 90. 
 181. Geoff Earle, Linda Daschle to Lobby the Senate, THE HILL (Wash., D.C.), Dec. 8, 
2004, at 4.  
 182. Mencimer, supra note 162 (“[I]n case her clients forget who she’s married to, behind 
her desk is a giant framed print of the U.S. Senate insigne.”).  
 183. The website of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, once used this 
term in its profile of Linda Daschle. See Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, 
PC, http://www.bakerdonelson.com (follow “Attorneys” hyperlink; then “D” hyperlink; then 
select “Daschle, Linda H.” hyperlink) (last visited May 6, 2007). The firm, however, 
subsequently deleted the following paragraph, which included the reference to Daschle’s access 
to “insider intelligence”: 
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jewelry of Rebecca Cox (wife of former Representative Christopher 
Cox (R-CA)). While lobbying, she reportedly wears her “member’s 
spouse” pin, which both conveys “insider status” and ensures access 
to restricted areas of the Capitol.184 
Another set of practices entails limitations undertaken by the 
lawmaker spouse. For example, although critics have challenged their 
assertions,185 Representative Blunt has claimed to recuse himself 
from any issue affecting Altria, his spouse’s client,186 and Senator 
John McCain (R-AZ) has stated that he recuses himself from issues 
affecting the beer industry, because of the position of his wife, Cindy 
McCain, as vice president and director of the Hensley company, one 
of the county’s largest beer distributors.187  
These self-imposed restrictions and the questions that they raise 
show the limits of an appearance-based standard. Power couples’ 
practices acknowledge that their marriages merit special 
accommodations; yet, problematic appearances persist despite these 
accommodations. Further, self-imposed ad hoc restrictions fail to 
signal institutional concern about these difficulties. Reformers 
understandably have called for more. 
 
While Linda's experience and effectiveness are important to her clients, there is 
another reason they value her service – her frequent reporting of insider intelligence. 
Linda scours the news coming out of Washington each day for developments of 
concern to her clients and reports to them on what she learns. “We put a premium on 
keeping our clients informed,” she says. “We do not want our clients to be caught by 
surprise by something that the federal government might do.” 
One can view this past profile of Linda Daschle by searching Google and opening cached 
material, which displays past postings that have since been removed or deleted, available at 
http://72.14.209.104/search?q=cache:YEeZ7C4aAcAJ:www.bakerdonelson.com/ContentWide.asp
x%3FNodeID%3D32%26PersonID%3D1820+baker+donelson+daschle+insider+intelligence&hl=
en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us. 
 184. Mary Ann Akers, Necklace Envy, ROLL CALL (Wash., D.C.), Aug. 2, 2006, available 
at 2006 WLNR 13334499; Nick Baumann & Oliver Haydock, Washington's 60 Sizzlingest 
Power Couples!, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 10641120. 
 185. Press Release, supra note 167; see James Ridgeway, Smoke, Mirrors, and White 
Noise: Campaign Notebook, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y., N.Y.), Jan. 19–25, 2000, at 32, 32, 
available at http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0003,ridgeway,11890,6.html; see also Brogan, 
supra note 174.  
 186. See Justice, supra note 14. Blunt’s spokesperson “said the family had taken pains to 
prevent conflicts. ‘It’s something they have given a lot of thought to and they believe the policy 
in place is best for everyone . . . .’” Id. On the problems presented by a legislator’s recusal, see 
infra notes 224–25 and accompanying text. 
 187. Ridgeway, supra note 185. 
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C. Reforms and Their Problems 
At this writing, Senator Vitter’s proposal to bar official contact by 
senators and their staffs with spousal lobbyists stands out because it 
would impose explicit restrictions on power couples, and it provides 
a template for even more far-reaching restrictions.188 In fact, 
however, this approach constitutes only one of several different 
measures that have emerged from efforts to accomplish government 
ethics reform. Moreover, the norms that some power couples have 
employed might provide additional starting points for such rules, 
whether included in new legislation or adopted as new internal ethics 
standards.  
Some of the reforms initiated at the start of the 110th Congress 
and applicable to power couples follow familiar paths. For example, 
new House Rules mandate disclosure of earmarks,189 including 
written certification that neither the lawmaker nor a spouse has a 
financial interest in the earmark or other special benefit.190 The bill 
passed by the Senate would impose similar requirements.191 
Alternatively, one might classify these new provisions as rules 
designed to prevent conflicts of interests on the part of legislators, 
another familiar approach192 even more clearly apparent in Senate 
prohibitions on promoting earmarks that would benefit financially a 
senator, spouse, or immediate family member.193 And although the 
reforms do not address gifts to and from spouses, both the House and 
 
 188. In addition, it forms part on a larger ethics bill that passed the Senate by a wide 
margin. For a description of the circumstances of passage, see supra notes 12, 34–38, and 
accompanying text. 
 189. See H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. § 404(b)(17) (2007). 
 190. Id. 
 191. S. 1, 110th Cong. § 103(4)(a)(5) (2007). 
 192. A proposal by Representatives Rahm Emanuel (D-IL) and Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) 
would prevent lawmakers and their spouses or immediate family members from personally 
benefiting from any earmarks and would also ban earmark awards to any entity employing the 
sponsor’s spouse, immediate family member, or former staff member or employee and to any 
entity represented by a lobbying firm that employs a spouse or family member of the sponsor. 
Press Release, Congressman Rahm Emanuel, Emanuel, Van Hollen Announce Real Earmark 
Reform (Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/il05_emanuel/ 
EARMARKS_09122006.html. 
 193. See 153 CONG. REC. S783-84 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2007). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/9
p 207 Appleton Rimmer book pages.doc  10/2/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  Power Couples  
 
 
245
the Senate have acted to tighten the gift limits, by eliminating gifts 
from lobbyists to lawmakers altogether.194 
Several less familiar approaches deserve attention as well. Like 
Senator Vitter’s amendment that passed the Senate, some reforms 
would restrict access of lawmakers and their staffs to spousal or 
family lobbyists. For example, the version of the bill that was initially 
introduced in the Senate, before acceptance of the Vitter amendment, 
included a provision simultaneously broader and narrower: 
If a Member’s spouse or immediate family member is a 
registered lobbyist under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 
or is employed or retained by such a registered lobbyist for the 
purpose of influencing legislation, the Member shall prohibit 
all staff employed by that Member (including staff in personal, 
committee and leadership offices) from having any official 
contact with the Member’s spouse or immediate family 
member.195 
Similar to a bill that passed the Senate in March 2006,196 this 
provision extends beyond Senator Vitter’s approach to reach family 
members other than spouses, while more narrowly imposing 
restrictions on lobbying relationships only between a specific 
lawmaker’s office and that lawmaker’s own spouse or family 
member. The House’s bill applies this narrow restriction only when 
the lobbyist is a spouse.197 
Kimberly Dorgan, wife of Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND), who 
lobbies on behalf of the American Council of Life Insurers, has 
adhered only to such a self-imposed limitation and freely lobbies all 
legislative offices except for that of her husband.198 But some sources 
assert that such minimal restrictions can easily be circumvented, say, 
 
 194. In the 110th Congress, the House changed the rule to prohibit a lawmaker from 
knowingly accepting any gift from a registered lobbyist or entity employing registered 
lobbyists. H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. § 203(a) (2007). The Senate passed a similar restriction. S. 
1, § 108. Query how these measures treat gifts to lawmakers from their lobbyist spouses. 
 195. S. 1, § 110. Note that an identical provision passed as § 113(a) in Senate Bill 1 in the 
110th Congress. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 196. S. 2349, 109th Cong. (2006). This bill passed the Senate on March 29, 2006, but never 
became law. See 152 CONG. REC. S2511 (Mar. 29, 2006). 
 197. H.R. 2316, 110th Cong. § 401 (2007); see supra text accompanying note 45. 
 198. Earle, supra note 181; Neubauer et al., supra note 16. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 207 Appleton Rimmer book pages.doc  10/2/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 24:207 
 
 
246
by having another member of the lobbyist spouse’s firm make the 
call.199 Further, one needs little imagination to conclude that a 
lobbyist has special access and creates questionable appearances 
when she calls on her (or his) spouse’s legislative colleagues. Indeed, 
this proposal seems to exemplify a familiar criticism of measures 
designed to eliminate appearances of impropriety: Such measures, in 
their emphasis on appearances, might well distract attention from 
substantive improprieties and the need for substantive reforms.200 
Power couples’ practices suggest other plausible restrictions that 
reach farther than one lawmaker’s office but fall short of a complete 
ban on spousal lobbying. As noted, although their assertions have 
prompted challenges, both Linda Daschle and Abigail Blunt have 
claimed to avoid lobbying the Senate and House, respectively, 
depending on where their husbands served.201 Indeed, Senator 
Vitter’s amendment addresses only senators, their staffs, and their 
spouses, consistent with the self-imposed restrictions followed by the 
Daschles and the Blunts. Senator Vitter stated on the Senate floor, 
however, that he would have preferred a more expansive restriction 
but kept his amendment narrow in scope to meet the procedural 
requirement of “germaneness.”202 
In considering more finely-tuned approaches, the jurisdiction of a 
lawmaker also seems relevant to the analysis of the possible 
appearance of impropriety. When a lawmaker is a member of the 
party leadership or chair of a particular committee, the lobbyist 
spouse could limit her contacts accordingly. For example, to address 
the probable appearance of impropriety and possible conflicts of 
interest arising from situations such as that of the Stevenses, when the 
Senator chaired the Appropriations Committee while his wife 
reportedly worked as an appropriations lobbyist,203 a rule could 
prohibit a spouse’s or relative’s lobbying before committees that the 
lawmaker chairs or on which he serves as a member. Doris Matsui 
(D-CA) followed this approach before taking the congressional seat 
 
 199. Neubauer et al., supra note 16. 
 200. See Morgan, supra note 96, at 610–13. 
 201. See supra notes 173–77 and accompanying text. 
 202. See 153 CONG. REC. S492 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. S640 (daily ed. 
Jan. 17, 2007). 
 203. But see supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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of her late husband, Robert Matsui (D-CA), choosing not to lobby 
any member on the Ways and Means Committee, of which her 
husband was a senior member.204 
To the extent that appearances of impropriety survive these 
tailored approaches, one might proceed further. For example, the 
House bill expresses Congress’s sense that lobbyists act 
inappropriately when they use family relationships with legislators 
“to gain special advantages over other lobbyists.”205 One could read 
this provision broadly as a general condemnation of lobbying by 
spouses and other family members. Alternatively, the language is 
susceptible of a much narrower interpretation, limited only to 
particular instances of family lobbying undertaken for the purpose of 
gaining “special advantages.”  
Beyond expressing a sense of the impropriety of lobbying by 
spouses and family members, Congress might take more direct 
action, endeavoring to halt all such lobbying. William Canfield, 
former senior staff counsel to the Senate Ethics Committee, laments 
that this solution was not adopted years ago, when the issue of 
appropriate careers for political wives first arose.206 Proposals by 
Senator Vitter illustrate two different paths for accomplishing this 
end. The first, which the Senate did not pass, aims at the lobbying 
spouse—but does so with a vengeance. Applying to members of both 
chambers and their spouses, it would punish under the statutes 
prohibiting bribery, graft, and conflicts interest:  
[a]ny person who is the spouse of a Member of Congress and 
who was not serving as a registered lobbyist at least 1 year 
prior to the election of that Member of Congress to office and 
who, after the election of such Member, knowingly lobbies on 
behalf of a client for compensation any Member of Congress 
 
 204. Juliet Eilperin, The Ties That Bind on Capitol Hill, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2003, at 
A19. 
 205. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also Margaret Carlson, Ethics When 
Spouses Earn Paychecks, TIME, Mar. 30, 1992, at 30 (article featuring subtitle that says “As 
politicians’ wives increasingly forge careers of their own, questions about conflicts of interest 
inevitably arise”). 
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or is associated with any such lobbying activity by an 
employer of that spouse . . . .207 
Some skeptics have contended that restrictions on lobbying might 
violate the First Amendment’s guarantee of the right “to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances”208—although surely 
Congress can control lobbying without violating the Constitution. By 
its own terms, however, this proposal would criminalize the current 
employment of several congressional spouses—those who began 
their lobbying careers post-election, such as Lucy Calautti, the wife 
Senator Kent Conrad.209 Further, this proposal would not only punish 
lobbying by such spouses but also their “association” with such 
lobbying by an employer. Although Senator Vitter initially proposed 
a “grandfather provision” that would protect all those lobbying on the 
date of enactment,210 he subsequently removed this exception, which 
he said “would allow everyone who’s doing it now to keep doing 
it.”211 Nonetheless, requiring an individual to leave her job, on 
penalty of a criminal prosecution, goes further than restrictions in 
comparable contexts. For example, anti-nepotism rules are not 
typically embodied in criminal prohibitions, even if they might 
separate one spouse from employment because of the identity of the 
other spouse.212 And, even conflict of interest rules applicable to 
lawyer spouses generally create personal disqualifications, but not 
disqualifications applicable to a spouse’s entire law firm.213 A 
parallel restriction might disqualify a lobbyist from official contact 
with her spouse and his staff, but not with all the other members of 
the legislative body—much like the approach originally included in 
the Senate bill, before the addition of Senator Vitter’s 
amendments.214 
 
 207. S. 105, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007). Senator Vitter originally tried to include a provision 
using identical language in the ethics reform bill. See 153 CONG. REC. S322-S323 (daily ed. 
Jan. 10, 2007). 
 208. See Kranish, supra note 90. 
 209. See Newmyer, supra note 44. 
 210. See 153 CONG. REC. S323 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 2007). 
 211. See Interview, supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 212. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 3110 (2000); Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703 
(6th Cir. 2001).  
 213. See MODEL R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8, 1.10 (2001).  
 214. See S. 1, 110th Congress § 113(a) (2007); supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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In addition, although Senator’s Vitter’s original proposal would 
not apply retroactively in the sense that it would not punish conduct 
occurring before its enactment, it would upset settled expectations 
and impose opportunity costs on individuals who might have pursued 
different employment in the past had they known that the rules would 
change.215 In other words, lobbyist spouses like Lucy Calautti would 
risk prosecution under this reform because the facts indicate that she 
began her lobbying practice after Senator Conrad’s election.216 Thus, 
despite her strong independent career in politics that preceded her 
marriage, she would be required to leave her work as a lobbyist for 
Major League Baseball217 or risk prosecution. Similarly, the 
exception would also appear to provide no refuge for other senators’ 
spouses, such as reputed appropriations lobbyist Catherine 
Stevens,218 as well as several representatives’ spouses.219 
In contrast, another proposal introduced by Senator Vitter, the one 
adopted by the Senate, takes a different route. First, it would prohibit 
members of the Senate and their staffs from having any “official 
contact with any spouse of a Member who is a registered lobbyist 
under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, or is employed or 
retained by such registered lobbyist.”220 In its present form, this 
proposal would make only one chamber off limits to spousal 
lobbyists, but it might eventually shut down spousal lobbyists’ access 
to all of Congress, if Senator Vitter has his way.221 Thus, the spousal 
lobbyist would not face criminal prosecution, but part or all of her job 
would disappear. Second, this proposal includes an exception for not 
 
 215. Senator Trent Lott has expressed concerns about “the innocent spouse.” See 
Chaddock, supra note 10. 
 216. See Newmyer, supra note 44.  
 217. See id. 
 218. Catherine Stevens joined her Washington, D.C., law firm in 2001. Catherine Ann 
Stevens, http://www.mayerbrown.com (follow “Lawyers” hyperlink; then type “Stevens” in the 
Lawyer Name Search box; then follow “Stevens, Catherine Ann” hyperlink) (last visited May 6, 
2007). Senator Stevens joined the U.S. Senate in 1968. See http://stevens.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm?FuseAction=AboutSenatorStevens.Biography (last visited June 15, 2007). But see 
Newmyer, supra note 44. 
 219. See Newmyer, supra note 44. 
 220. See supra text accompanying note 40 (quoting this provision). 
 221. He narrowed the scope of the provision originally proposed to satisfy the procedural 
requirement of “germaneness.” See Solomon, supra note 11; supra notes 36–37 and 
accompanying text 
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only those spouses whose work as lobbyists began one year before 
the lawmaker’s election, but also those whose work as lobbyists 
began one year before the marriage.222 Otherwise, however, the 
restriction contains no “grandfather provision.”223  
This approach has several attractive features. First, it aims at the 
lawmaker, the real holder of the public trust, not the lobbyist. Second, 
it avoids some of the problems of alternative measures that also aim 
at the lawmaker, like the recusal procedure practiced by 
Representative Blunt and Senator McCain.224 The recusal of one 
lawmaker might fail to address significant appearances of 
impropriety, because—like any disqualification that applies only to 
one couple at a time—it might leave ample room for pressures and 
influences experienced by legislative colleagues, who presumably 
know that the spouse of “one of their own” has an interest in a 
particular matter.225  
Finally, the version of Senator Vitter’s amendment passed by the 
Senate appropriately attempts the difficult task of distinguishing 
spouses with independent careers. The exception for spouses who had 
pre-election or pre-marriage jobs as lobbyists seems designed to 
protect individuals who worked as lobbyists even before they had a 
formal relationship with a legislator, while obviating one of the 
problems that Miller hoped his “smell test” would prevent: the hiring 
of one spouse to lobby primarily because the other spouse is a 
member of Congress.226 
On the other hand, especially if this approach ultimately applies to 
both chambers, as Senator Vitter would like,227 some wives would 
 
 222. See S. 1, 110th Cong. § 113 (2007); E-mail from Joel DiGrado, Press Secretary for 
Senator David Vitter, to Robyn Rimmer (Jan. 22, 2007, 10:32:19 CST) (on file with authors). 
 223. See Interview, supra note 10. 
 224. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text. 
 225. Critics of recusal also make the following points: first, constituents have the right to 
expect that their representatives will participate fully in the congressional activities for which 
they were elected to serve. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Congressional Ethics and Constituent 
Advocacy in an Age of Mistrust, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (1996). Second, a recusal 
requirement would highlight the extent to which a candidate for election or reelection might be 
limited in this capacity. Third, as Marc Miller pointed out years ago in first examining the 
issues facing political spouses, “voting is widely believed to be a constitutional right of 
members.” MILLER, supra note 65, at 33. 
 226. See supra note 81. 
 227. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
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probably lose their jobs, because much of their previous work would 
become off limits to them. New political spouses would have fewer 
choices about careers in D.C., in turn perhaps prompting some to 
remain back in the home jurisdiction. Ironically, Senator Vitter’s 
approach results in an official “blessing” for members of the so-
called “second wives club”228—those seasoned lobbyists who marry 
legislators, often taking the place of “first wives,” whom the new 
rules would treat much more strictly. 
Observers have praised the Senate’s action on the ground that it 
demonstrates the 110th Congress’s serious commitment to ethics 
reform.229 Certainly, it highlights how the pre-existing approach, 
leaving all such matters within individual discretion, is not inevitable. 
Yet its attempt to draw lines and its consideration of some of the 
competing values at stake invites closer scrutiny. In the sections 
below, we explore the difficult questions that emerge. 
D. The Uniqueness of Marriage?  
Why do Senator Vitter’s proposals address only power couples, 
without reaching legislators’ other close relatives who lobby?230 In 
contrast, new amendments to Senate rules disallow efforts to secure 
the passage of earmarks that would financially benefit the Senator in 
question, his spouse, or any immediate family member.231 And the 
House’s “sense of Congress” statement simply speaks of “immediate 
family members,”232 presumably including spouses and other close 
relatives. As noted, several family members of public officials other 
than spouses occupy positions similar to those of the lobbyists we 
have examined. For example, the three sons of Senate Majority 
Leader Harry Reid have worked for firms that lobby or seek 
government benefits233; the two sons of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) 
 
 228. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 229. See, e.g., Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast Jan. 21, 2007); Editorial, Reform, 
Finally, in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at A10. 
 230. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 232. H.R. 2316, 110th Cong. § 209 (2007); see 153 CONG. REC. H5770–71 (daily ed. May 
24, 2007). 
 233. See infra app. 1. 
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work respectively for the National Nutritional Foods Association and 
for a firm representing GlaxoSmithKline, Qwest, and Verizon234; and 
the son of Representative Dennis Hastert (R-IL) works as a lobbyist 
representing the Small Business Technology Coalition and Accurate 
Automation.235 What “appearances” arise from their work? Put 
differently, one might ask whether marriage is—or appears—unique. 
Certainly, we might find in many given family relationships (say, 
a father and a son) the same sort of confidential communication, 
generosity, beneficence, caring, and concern for another’s well-being 
that ideally are thought to characterize marriage. Nonetheless, we 
speculate that marriage differs from other family relationships for 
purposes of this analysis. Two reasons support this distinction. 
First, the legal treatment of marriage as an economic partnership 
distinguishes spouses from others with close family relationships. 
Although many different adult relatives might choose to share their 
financial resources with one another, the law imposes sharing 
principles only on spouses.236 Does the fact that the law gives each 
spouse a financial stake in the other’s resources upon dissolution (and 
during marriage in community property states237) create at least 
appearances of impropriety for spouses that do not pertain to other 
family members?238 Put differently, instead of comparing marriage 
and other close familial relationships, should we be comparing the 
rules that would apply to a legislator’s business associates or 
partners—given the frequency with which the “business partnership” 
analogy is invoked in efforts to explain the financial incidents of 
marriage?239 Consider here the problems raised when a lawmaker’s 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Similar consequences follow for those deemed domestic partners under approaches 
like that developed by the American Law Institute. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION, supra note 20, at 907–43 (Chapter 6 on Domestic Partners). 
 237. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 238. Note, however, that the restrictions on lawmakers’ receipt of outside earned income 
does not take into account community property laws, so that the undivided one-half interest in 
his spouse’s income that a lawmaker from a community property state would get is disregarded 
for purposes of such restrictions. See House Rule XXV cl. 4(d)(2), available at http://clerk. 
house.gov/legisAct/legisProc/rules/rule25.html.  
 239. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE 
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 130, 136–41 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 
1990); cf. Katherine Wells Meighan, For Better or for Worse: A Corporate Finance Approach 
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work veers too close to a business in which he has a stake—as 
recently illustrated by stories about the efforts of former Senate 
Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) to become a leader on health care 
legislation while a major stockholder in HCA, Inc., a large for-profit 
hospital chain founded by his father and brother.240 
Second, cohabitation is a typical (although not inevitable) incident 
of marriage, so we ordinarily expect spouses to live in the same 
locale.241 As a result of this norm, the need for a legislator’s spouse to 
find employment in D.C. triggers the tension that we examine.242 One 
can find a sympathetic illustration in stories about Representative Jim 
McCrery (R-LA), who in 2004 planned to leave Congress to spend 
more time with his family in Shreveport until his wife, Johnette, a 
television reporter and journalism professor, found work as vice 
president of a prominent public relations firm in D.C.243 How should 
we reconcile the competing interpretations of this development, 
reflected in one news report stating both that the “McCrerys find 
happiness in D.C.” and that “the firm will no doubt find it valuable to 
have a pipeline to [Johnette McCrery’s] husband, who many think 
with be the next chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee”?244 
By contrast, adult children, especially adult children with careers, 
do not necessarily or usually live in the same place as their parents—
even if everyone is presumptively free to reside and work where he or 
she wants.245 Does this distinction suggest that spouses ought to 
present a more troublesome case for restrictions than other family 
members? In other words, does the peculiar dilemma of the senator’s 
 
to Valuing Educational Degrees at Divorce, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 193 (1997); Bea Ann 
Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689 
(1990). 
 240. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, For Frist, A Political Fortune May Be Inextricably Linked to 
a Financial One, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, at A1. 
 241. See, e.g., Janice Compton & Robert A. Pollak, Why Are Power Couples Increasingly 
Concentrated in Large Metropolitan Areas? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 10918, 2006). 
 242. Nonetheless, not all senators’ and representatives’ spouses move to D.C. 
 243. Bruce Alpert & Bill Walsh, News from the Louisiana Delegation in the Nation’s 
Capital, TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), July 25, 2004, at 4.  
 244. Id. 
 245. Indeed, not all federal lobbyists are headquartered in D.C. Many travel regularly from 
a different home base to D.C. to meet with legislators and their staffs. 
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or representative’s professional spouse who wants to move with the 
lawmaker to D.C. call for a measure of flexibility and tolerance of 
which other family members, like adult children, are less deserving? 
What does Congress’s rhetoric about marriage246 mean for reforms 
that might thwart spousal efforts to live in the same city?  
Even if the focus narrows to conjugal couples who choose to 
cohabit in the D.C. area, however, one might raise line-drawing 
questions about distinguishing spouses from those in non-marital 
intimate cohabitation relationships. Certainly, the reported incidence 
of such relationships has been rising, with married couples now a 
minority of households nationally.247 Further, if economic partnership 
triggers conflicts or appearances of impropriety for spouses, then 
consider the fact that some legal authorities and family law reform 
initiatives provide financial protections even for informal domestic 
partners, in order to address the dependence often arising in such 
relationships, just as in marriage.248  
Despite some significant similarities between some married 
couples, on the one hand, and some unmarried couples, on the other, 
we think marriage provides at least the best starting point for analysis 
of lawmaker-lobbyist relationships. The legal treatment of marriage 
remains more well-established than the legal treatment of 
cohabitation, and the public’s understanding of marriage—along with 
the resulting appearances—no doubt should be more well-defined 
than the perception of other intimate relationships. Many lawmakers 
might well regard marriage as special, privileged, and important, just 
as their rhetoric insists.249 Finally, despite some notable 
 
 246. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 247. See Roberts, 51%, supra note 133; Roberts, It’s Official, supra note 133. 
 248. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 20, at 907–43 
(Chapter 6 on Domestic Partners). By “informal domestic partnerships,” we mean those 
relationships not formally celebrated or registered under laws such as Vermont’s civil union 
statute, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1201 (2002) (limiting such relationships to same-sex couples) 
or California’s domestic partnership statute, CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(5) (2004) (limiting such 
relationships to same-sex couples or couples in which one individual is “aged”). Family law’s 
recent emphasis on functional tests recognizes that, in terms of lived experience, informal 
relationships often are indistinguishable from formal relationships. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra 
note 2. 
 249. Witness, for example, the statements on the Senate floor made in support of the 
proposed constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage. 152 CONG. REC. S5945 (daily 
ed. June 15, 2006); id. at S5473 (daily ed. June 6, 2006); id. at. S5393–S5394 (daily ed. May 
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exceptions,250 most lawmakers find marrying more politically 
advantageous than prolonging other intimate arrangements—even 
when marrying entails displacing one spouse to make room for a new 
one.251  
III. COMPETING VALUES 
A. A Closer Look at Power Couples, Power, and Gender 
From this analysis, the lawmaker-lobbyist marriage emerges as 
both the most compelling and yet the most troublesome case for 
restrictions. This case is compelling because of the partnership 
understanding of marriage. Perhaps it should come as no surprise that 
Senator Vitter’s home state, Louisiana, has a community property 
regime,252 which even during marriage gives each spouse an 
undivided one-half interest in the earnings of the other, in contrast to 
equitable distribution states, which impose the concept of marital 
property only at dissolution.253 
This case is troublesome because of the expectations and 
preferences that spouses will live and work in the same city and 
because of persistent gender disparities. Among power couples, most 
lawmaker spouses are men, most lobbyist spouses are women,254 and 
 
26, 2006). 
 250. For example, the late Representative Gerry Studds incited negative publicity upon 
discovery of his affair with a seventeen-year-old male congressional page. See Damien Cave, 
Gerry Studds, Gay Congressman Who Served 12 Terms, Is Dead at 69, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 
2006, § 1, at 41. However, a domiciliary of Massachusetts, by 2004 former Representative 
Studds was able to marry, although his husband was not eligible for a survivor’s pension, given 
the federal law limiting recognition to male-female marriages. See id.; Patrick Healy, Mrs. 
Clinton Wouldn’t Block Law if Albany Backed Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at 
B5; see also Matt Bai, The Outsider, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), Feb. 2, 2004, at 30 (profile of 
former Senator Gary Hart (D-CO), who had a well-publicized “fling” with former model Donna 
Rice). 
 251. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Marianne Gingrich Wants to Sell a Book About Her 
Ex-Husband, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), July 18, 2000, at C7 (reporting the extramarital affair 
between her ex-husband, former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA), and his aide, her 
divorce, and his remarriage to the aide); Kate Zernike, What Some Politicians Fear Most: The 
Ex-Wife, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2005, § 4, at 14; see also Cottle, supra note 85 (“In some cases, 
the second-wife-to-be is assumed to have helped show her predecessor to the door.”). 
 252. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 152, at 238–39. 
 253. See TURNER, supra note 153; see also supra note 151 and accompanying text.  
 254. See supra note 70. Even the token male member of the lobbying group, Bob Dole, no 
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restrictions more often will disadvantage lobbyists than lawmakers. 
Indeed, restrictions that aim at power couples while ignoring other 
family ties between lawmakers and lobbyists not only disadvantage 
women but disproportionately protect men, given the number of sons 
and male relatives other than spouses who lobby.255  
This concern about gender disparities receives reinforcement from 
the history of the “political spouse”—a phenomenon that first 
received attention only at the time when significant numbers of 
middle- and upperclass married women had started to enter the 
workforce.256 From this perspective, the power couple seems to 
present a contemporary dilemma—a difficulty that we cannot escape 
without replacing the power couple with the more traditional and 
more patriarchal “power husband.” Will such consequences follow if 
reforms like Senator Vitter’s proposals become law? 
A closer look reveals an alternative way to view the status quo 
and the gendered implications of change, however. Some social 
scientists claim that, even today, men prefer to marry women in 
subordinate jobs, rather than those in superior positions.257 One can 
detect this hierarchical pattern even among power couples. Observers 
point out that lawmakers with close family members who lobby are 
themselves the “top members of Congress.”258 Such observers also 
note that lawmakers “are finding that family members, especially 
wives, can play a valuable role in advancing their political 
careers.”259 From this viewpoint, many lobbyist spouses emerge less 
 
doubt has his own significant connections with sitting senators, with whom he served for many 
years, that overshadow whatever advantages his position as Senator Elizabeth Dole’s spouse 
provides. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. In other words, Bob Dole exemplifies the 
problem of the so-called “revolving door” more prominently than he typifies the lawmaker’s 
lobbyist spouse. 
 255. See supra notes 56–57; infra app. 1.  
 256. See supra notes 61–71 and accompanying text. 
 257. See John Schwartz, Glass Ceilings at Altar as Well as Boardroom, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
14, 2004, at F7. But see Annie Murphy Paul, The Real Marriage Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
2006, § 6, at 22 (examining perceived rise in assortive mating and consequences for class 
divisions); Kate Zernike, Why Are There So Many Single Americans?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 
2007, § 4, at 1 (same). 
 258. Hulse, supra note 59. 
 259. James Ridgeway, In D.C., It’s All Relative: Congress Members, Staff, and Lobbyists—
It’s All One Big Happy Family, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y., N.Y.), Dec. 14, 2005, at 20; see also 
Cottle, supra note 85; Neubauer & Cooper, supra note 179. Senator Vitter also introduced an 
amendment that would have prohibited campaign committees and political action committees 
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as individuals with their own independent careers than as helpmates 
who provide support for (and a reflection of) a particular lawmaker’s 
exceptional power. Of course, the notion of marriage as a partnership 
suggests that both spouses will benefit from the status, influence, and 
resulting earnings of either one. The partnership concept proves too 
much, however, because it would permit a requirement that women 
married to lawmakers must be housewives260 on the theory that they 
will reap a share of the benefits of their husbands’ careers.  
At the same time, Senator Vitter’s proposal correctly suggests that 
this “helpmate” characterization does not fit all power couples. The 
exception for those whose lobbying began at least a year before the 
marriage or the senator’s election reflects the need to scrutinize 
closely for would-be independence. Yet his particular approach 
reveals significant difficulties. Continuing a previous lobbying career 
does not necessarily insulate one from functioning as an 
accoutrement of a legislator spouse’s power. The exception, 
moreover, provides an ironic twist, especially for legislators whose 
usual pronouncements on marriage emphasize conservative and 
traditional family values.261 Those like Johnette McCrery, who wish 
to join their spouses in D.C.,262 will face significant barriers to at 
least certain forms of employment. By contrast, the members of the 
“second wives club,” such as Abigail Blunt, will find their work as 
lobbyists protected.263 What weight should Congress give to the 
incentives that this framework creates and the messages that it sends? 
 
from employing the spouses and other family members of candidates for federal office, but the 
Senate voted to table that measure. See 153 CONG. REC. S309 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2007).  
 260. One magazine article, published during the 1992 presidential race, commented on 
Hillary Rodham Clinton’s defiance of the then-common norms for political spouses: “[T]he 
unspoken rule of political life is that a wife will tend to home and family and be by her 
husband’s side when he runs. Working violates that rule.” Carlson, supra note 206. 
 261. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra notes 243–44 and accompanying text. 
 263. True, at the time of this writing, the provision in Senate Bill 1 applies only to the 
Senate and the examples cited are House spouses, but a broader rule remains a possibility. See 
supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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B. Fine Tuning 
Of course, despite its salience for family law policy and gender 
equality, the issue of spousal lobbying implicates other important 
values as well. In evaluating proposals such as Senator Vitter’s 
amendment, one cannot ignore well-founded concerns about the 
institutional image of Congress and the public trust that it holds. A 
free-rein approach to spousal lobbying raises charges of conflicts of 
interest, appearances of impropriety, and unequal access to 
government—all symptoms of the “culture of corruption”264—that in 
turn undermine the very political viability, and hence power, of 
lawmakers who might have the most to lose by restrictions. Yet, a 
range of countervailing considerations, including marriage policy, 
gender equality, and career autonomy, all call for restrictions that 
sweep no more broadly than necessary. 
Senator Vitter’s amendment reveals the challenges of crafting a 
sound rule that walks this difficult line. He concedes that he scaled 
back his proposal to make it “germane” and to get it passed 
quickly.265 Yet, those voting for the larger ethics reform bill could not 
have fully appreciated the competing values at stake in his 
amendment, given the absence of committee exploration, of full 
debate, and of a public vote. For example, what might the senators 
have learned from hearings on the measure and other possible 
alternatives, such as recusal options? Such hearings might have 
explored how Senator Vitter’s approach would affect lawmakers, 
spouses now lobbying, the employment prospects of those moving to 
D.C. in the future, the public, and the lobbying community and also 
whether limiting lobbying to the other chamber addresses the ethical 
problems or not. 
Perhaps much needed deeper investigation would reveal that 
legislation creates too blunt an instrument to capture the nuances that 
deserve recognition here. Although much has changed since Marc 
Miller propounded his “smell test,”266 the concept of a multi-factored, 
case-by-case assessment might well hold the best hope for the 
 
 264. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 265. See supra notes 37, 202 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
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delicate sorting and fine tuning necessary to identify the most 
appropriate response for a given power couple, in light of the 
competing values at stake. 
We can envision several ways to implement an individualized or 
case-by-case evaluation, although we recognize that many details 
would require resolution. First, invigorated congressional ethics 
committees, with more robust investigative authority and 
enforcement tools, might perform this function. For example, a 
proposal under consideration in the House would create an 
independent, bipartisan ethics panel to allow nonlawmakers to file 
ethics complaints against lawmakers,267 a procedure already available 
in the Senate but seldom used.268 Telling data from the House’s 
existing approach make the case for change: According to one report, 
during the past decade, over a dozen lawmakers have been indicted or 
investigated by law enforcement, but lawmakers have requested only 
three congressional investigations.269 Under the proposal, a panel of 
outsiders could filter out spurious complaints before referral to the 
House’s ethics committee, that is, the Committee on Standards of 
Official Conduct.270  
Although this process focuses on complaints for past conduct, one 
can imagine a more forward-looking approach. For example, before 
marrying a lobbyist, former Representative Jim Nussle (R-IA) met 
with the House ethics committee to discuss ways to avoid 
appearances of impropriety.271 Such avenues for individualized 
discussions on a prospective basis might prove particularly useful if 
any legislation ultimately enacted includes a less than precise 
expression of “the sense of Congress that the use of a family 
relationship by a lobbyist who is an immediate family member of a 
 
 267. See Elizabeth Williamson, Democrats Lose Traction on Reforms, WASH. POST, June 
11, 2007, at A15. 
 268. See Elizabeth Williamson, House Hesitates on Ethics Changes, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 
2007, at A25. 
 269. See Williamson, supra note 267. 
 270. Susan Ferrechio, Pelosi Expected to Back Proposal to Allow Outsiders to File Ethics 
Complaints, CQ TODAY, June 4, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 10786577. 
 271. See Norman Jane, Nussle Will Wed Lobbyist: Karen Chiccehitto, the Bride, Once 
Worked for Newt Gingrich, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 5, 2001, at B1. 
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Member of Congress to gain special advantages over other lobbyists 
is inappropriate.”272 
Alternatively, an independent ethics commission, proposed by 
Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) in the 109th Congress273 and by 
Senator Lieberman (ID-CN) and others in the 110th,274 could provide 
a vehicle for implementing a case-by-case evaluation. Although the 
Senate rejected the proposal,275 an ethics commission holds promise 
as a component of the type of approach to spousal lobbying that we 
believe the competing values require. 
First, like an invigorated ethics committee that receives outside 
complaints, an ethics commission would provide an official forum for 
bringing to light questionable conduct that in the past got exposure 
only through the work of journalists. Second, although originally 
envisioned as a non-partisan, independent “watchdog” that would 
conduct initial investigations of ethics violations,276 an ethics 
commission might also use its fact-finding capacities to assess 
prospectively and on an individual basis the propriety of specific 
spousal activities, just as Senator Lieberman suggested it might 
approve or disapprove “privately funded trips for Members or 
staff.”277 Thus, a commission could become a mechanism for 
developing carefully tailored responses appropriate to the wide range 
of situations that power couples present. Even if the committee’s or 
the commission’s authority would reach only the legislators 
themselves,278 such authority could certainly affect the conduct of 
 
 272. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 273. See Barack Obama-U.S. Senator for Illinois, http://obama.senate.gov/speech (follow 
“Senator Obama’s Opening Statement for Floor Debate on Ethics Reform” hyperlink). 
 274. See 153 CONG. REC. S433–35 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 2007); id. at S469–70. The co-
sponsors are Senators Collins (R-ME), Obama, McCain, Feingold (D-WI), Kerry (D-MA), and 
Carper (D-DE). 
 275. The Senate voted 71 to 27 against Senator Lieberman’s proposal. See U.S. Senate, 
Legislation & Records Home, http://www.senate.gov/legislature/LIS/rollcallvotecfm.cfm? 
congress=110&session=1&vote=00018. Nonetheless, several observers expressed support for 
this measure. See, e.g., Dennis F. Thompson, Congressional Ethics System Creates Conflict of 
Interest, ROLL CALL (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 17, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 940436; Editorial, 
supra note 229 (noting failure “to create an independent anticorruption monitor” and calling for 
House and Senate to join “in pursuing this needed measure”). 
 276. See Barack Obama, supra note 273. 
 277. See 153 CONG. REC. S434 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 2007). 
 278. Id. at S470. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/9
p 207 Appleton Rimmer book pages.doc  10/2/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  Power Couples  
 
 
261
spouses—as the projected consequences of Senator Vitter’s own 
amendment illustrate.279 
For example, a strengthened committee or an independent 
commission, receiving information from the outside and focusing on 
facts and particular cases, might have decided that Catherine Stevens 
should not (as reported) have engaged in appropriations lobbying 
while her husband headed the Senate Appropriations Committee, 
without barring her from lobbying altogether.280 Likewise, a more 
robust committee or an independent commission could have 
responded to the alleged efforts of Representative Blunt to insert a 
tobacco-favoring measure in homeland security legislation, given his 
wife’s position as a tobacco lobbyist281 or to the after-hours access to 
restricted areas of the Capitol by former Representative Cox’s 
lobbyist wife.282 This body might decide that lawmaker recusal offers 
the best solution in some situations, for example, when the lobbying 
spouse has only one client, illustrated by the work of Senator 
Conrad’s wife on behalf of Major League Baseball.283 And perhaps a 
full consideration of all the facts would produce the conclusion that 
Representative McCrery’s wife should be able to conduct some 
lobbying in D.C. or, alternatively, that her ongoing career as a 
journalist makes questionable her decision to work as a lobbyist, 
given her husband’s position.284 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This essay examines the lawmaker-lobbyist marriage, a not 
uncommon relationship that has just started to attract official 
attention, even in this era marked by calls for government ethics 
reforms. We have presented examples of such power couples, as well 
as early advice given to political spouses, the long-standing absence 
of clear limits, the couples’ self-imposed restrictions, and possibilities 
 
 279. See supra notes 36–44 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra notes 243–44. 
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for new rules—all against the background of several competing 
values and policies important in family law or government ethics. 
When we began this project, lawmaker-lobbyist marriages were a 
well-kept Washington secret. Our own exploration of this 
phenomenon unfolded at the same time that publicity increased and 
some official scrutiny developed. Despite the heightened attention, as 
this article goes to press in mid-June 2007, the various bills directly 
addressing spousal lobbying have yet to become law. At one level, 
the fate of the current reforms might signal whether the era of 
appearance-based ethics will continue or whether an era of 
substantive limits will supersede it. 
To the extent that avoiding appearances of impropriety provides 
the touchstone for ethical behavior, then, important variables in 
evaluating the status quo and possible reforms become how others 
understand contemporary marriage generally and how they see power 
couples’ marriages in particular. Under an appearance-based 
standard, spousal lobbying has long remained in a “gray zone” 
because today’s conception of marriage is rife with contradictions 
and ambiguities. Certainly, empirical investigation would teach us 
more about these issues and could yield valuable insights for both 
public policy and family law. One poll shows public disapproval of 
lobbyists’ contacts with lawmakers in their own families,285 but how 
does the public see the work of spousal lobbyists more generally?286 
Additional investigation might also reveal a more nuanced picture 
of power couples’ power. To square meaningful reform with a 
commitment to gender equality, we need more information about 
lobbyist spouses—how they get their positions, whose interest they 
serve, and whom their work benefits.  
Finally, however, this essay reveals the difficulties of a simple fix, 
even one like Senator Vitter’s amendment, which attempts to halt 
spousal lobbying while making room for spouses with independent 
lobbying careers. Bright-line rules can halt the most egregious cases, 
 
 285. See Eisler & Kelley, supra note 168, and accompanying text. 
 286. This is a separate question that the USA Today poll, supra note 285 and accompanying 
text, did not address. But cf. 153 CONG. REC. H5770 (daily ed. May 24, 2007) (remarks of 
Representative Castle erroneously claiming that USA Today poll suggests “that 80 percent of 
Americans believe it is wrong for lawmakers and their staffs to have contact with family 
members of other lawmakers who are lobbyists”). 
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but they do not permit the fine tuning that the competing values 
require. Instead, in pursuing reform that expresses official concern 
for the familial entanglements between lawmakers and lobbyists, 
Congress should gather information and confront directly the values 
at stake. Without foreclosing the possibility that a carefully crafted 
law might succeed, we find more promising an approach that would 
allow official and impartial evaluation on a power couple-by-power 
couple basis. 
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APPENDIX 1 
FAMILY MEMBERS LOBBYING CONGRESS∗ 
109TH CONGRESS1 
 
Senate 
1. Senator Trent Lott (R-MS)—son, Chester T. “Chet” Lott, Jr., 
of the Livingston Group represents BellSouth and Edison; he also 
lobbies for the Thoroughbred Racing Association and a company 
in Louisiana that builds vessels for the oil and gas industry. 
Senator Lott is a senior member of the communications 
subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee. 
2. Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK)—son, Ben Stevens, of Stevens 
and Associates is a government affairs consultant for various 
 
 ∗  Craig Holman, Mary Potori, and Brian Williams of Public Citizen prepared this list in 
2006, and they have approved some minor changes by the authors, who have also added the 
footnotes. 
 1. A recent National Journal report reveals even more apparent “power couples” among 
lawmakers with relatives who have strong ties to lobbying. See Marisa Katz, Family Ties, 
NAT’L J., Mar. 31, 2007, at 47. In the Senate, these couples include: (1) Senator Christopher 
Dodd (D-CN) and his wife, Jackie Clegg Dodd; (2) Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) and his 
wife, Barbara; (3) Senator Joe Lieberman (ID-CN) and his wife, Hadassah; (4) Senator Jay 
Rockefeller (D-WV) and his wife, Sharon; and (5) Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) and 
her husband, Ray. See id.; see also John Solomon, Reforms Omit Lobbyists Married to 
Lawmakers, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 889590. In the House, they 
include: (1) Representative John Dingell (D-MI) and his wife, Debbie; (2) Representative Tom 
Davis (R-VA) and his wife, Jeannemarie Devolites-Davis; (3) Representative Jo Ann Emerson 
(R-MO) and her husband, Ron Gladney; (4) Representative Eliot Engel (D-NY) and his wife, 
Pat; (5) Representative Stephanie Herseth Sandlin (D-SD) and her husband, Max; and (6) 
Representative James Oberstar (D-MN) and his wife, Jean. See Katz, supra. 
 Many articles refer to Debbie Dingell, the wife of Representative John Dingell, as a 
lobbyist. See, e.g., Steve Goldstein, Lobbying on the Hill Is Often a Family Affair, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Feb. 21, 2006, at A1; James Ridgeway, In D.C., It’s Relative: Congress Members, 
Staff, and Lobbyists—It’s All One Big Happy Family, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y., N.Y.), Dec. 14, 
2005, at 20; Elana Schor, Abramoff Report Reveals Ties to GOP, Democratic Members, THE 
HILL (Wash., D.C.), Oct. 3, 2006, at 3. However, the New York Times recently ran a correction 
stating that its article, When Lobbyists Say ‘I Do,’ Should They Add ‘I Won’t’?, had “referred 
imprecisely to Debbie Dingell. . . . While Ms. Dingell advises General Motors on lobbying 
strategy in her role as executive director of community and government relations, she is not 
currently a registered lobbyist.” See Corrections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at A2.  
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Alaskan interests, representing VECO, the Special Olympics, and 
(previously) Cook Inlet Regional Corporation. Wife, Catherine, 
works for Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw as a lobbyist previously 
working on appropriations matters. 
3. Senator Harry Reid (D-NV)—three sons and a son-in-law have 
worked for firms that lobby or seek government benefits. Key 
Reid works for Lionel, Sawyer & Collins’ Washington lobbying 
office, representing the City of Las Vegas and the City of 
Boulder. Son-in-law, Steve Barringer, is affiliated with MGN, 
which represents American Electric Power, National Mining 
Association, and Verizon. Sons Leif, Josh, and Rory also work 
for Lionel, Sawyer & Collins though they do not lobby on 
Capitol Hill. 
4. Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA)—son, Doug, lobbies for tribal 
and airport interests and is affiliated with Platinum Advisors. 
5. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT)—son, Parry, works for National 
Nutritional Foods Association. Son, Scott, works at Walker, 
Martin & Hatch, which represents GlaxoSmithKline, Qwest, and 
Verizon. Senator Hatch is a champion of the dietary supplement 
industry and big pharmaceutical makers.  
6. Senator Evan Bayh (D-IN)—father, Birch, former congressman, 
has returned to practicing law in D.C. He is affiliated with 
Venable, which represents Hilton Hotels, Marriott, and Verizon. 
7. Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND)—wife, Lucy Calautti, is the chief 
D.C. lobbyist for Major League Baseball and is also affiliated 
with Hostetler. 
8. Senator Elizabeth Dole (R-NC)—husband, Robert, is a lobbyist 
for Indonesia’s oil interests and is affiliated with Bob Dole 
Enterprises and Alston & Bird, representing Kosovo and Taiwan 
Tyco. 
9. Senator Bryon Dorgan (D-ND)—wife, Kimberly, is a lobbyist 
with the American Council of Life Insurers. 
10. Senator Michael Enzi (R-WY)—son, Brad, is a lobbyist for the 
Black Hills Corporation. 
11. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT)—son, Kevin, is affiliated with 
Downs, Rachlin, Martin, representing the American Petroleum 
Institute, Vermont Petroleum Association, and 3M Technologies. 
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12. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)—son, David, of Quinn, 
Gillespie & Associates represents Bell South, Citigroup, and 
Sony. 
13. Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS)—son, David, is a registered 
lobbyist. 
14. Senator Debbie Stabenow (D-MI)—son, Todd, works for the 
Michigan Credit Union League. 
15. Senator John Sununu (D-MI)—father, John, of JHS Associates 
represents the U.S. Chamber Alliance for Energy and Economic 
Growth. 
16. Senator John McCain (R-AZ)—wife, Cindy, is chairwoman of 
Hensley and Company. 
17. Senator George Voinovich (R-OH)—son, George, opened a 
public affairs and lobbying agency in 2004—Voinovich, Needles, 
and Dalton, stationed in Columbus. 
18. Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL)—wife, Loretta, is affiliated with 
Government Affairs Specialists, Inc., representing the American 
Lung Association of Illinois, Mazur & Associates, and 
Metropolitan Planning Council in lobbying the Illinois state 
legislature. 
19. Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA)—wife, Ruth, is Director of 
ConocoPhillips. 
20. Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)—wife, Anne, has worked for 
telecommunications companies such as Global Crossing Limited. 
She is chair of the board of Valor Telecom, which she helped 
found in 1999. 
21. Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE)—son, Beau, is a partner at a 
Delaware law firm that works closely with Simmons Cooper, one 
of the nation’s largest asbestos-plaintiff law firms, and regular 
Democratic donors. 
House 
1. Representative Dennis Hastert (R-IL)—son, Joshua, is a 
lobbyist on Capitol Hill (despite no previous experience in 
politics). He represents the Small Business Technology Coalition 
and Accurate Automation. 
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2. Representative Roy Blunt (R-MO)—wife, Abigail, is a lobbyist 
for Altria (parent company to Philip Morris). Son, Andrew, is 
affiliated with Schreimann, Rackers, Francka & Blunt, a firm that 
represents Kraft Foods, Miller Brewing, Philip Morris, and other 
state lobbyists in Missouri. Daughter, Amy, works for Blackwell 
Sanders Peper Martin. 
3. Representative John Mica (R-FL)—brother, Daniel, is Chief 
Executive Officer and representative of the Credit Union 
National Association. 
4. Representative George Miller (D-CA)—son, George Miller IV, 
works for Lang, Hansen, O’Malley & Miller with clients 
including Liberty Mutual Insurance, Phillip Morris Management 
Corporation, and Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of California. 
5. Representative David Obey (D-WI)—son, Craig, is a registered 
lobbyist for National Parks Conservation Association. 
6. Representative John Murtha (D-PA)—brother, Robert “Kit” 
Murtha, is partner of a lobbying firm that reportedly secured at 
least $20.8 million in defense contracts for ten companies it 
represented during 2005. 
7. Representative Nick Rahall (D-WV)—sister, Tanya Rahall, has 
been contracted as a lobbyist for the government of Qatar since 
2002, at a salary of $15,000 per month. 
8. Representative Bill Delahunt (D-MA)—daughter, Kara, joined 
firm of Weber Shandwick in 1998, where she lobbies on behalf 
of foreign interests, including the government of Colombia. 
9. Representative Luis Guiterrez (D-IL)—wife, Soraida, lobbies 
the Illinois state legislature on behalf of Popular Securities, 
Incorporated. 
10. Representative Maurice Hinchey (D-NY)—wife, Allison Lee, 
lobbies the New York state legislature. 
11. Representative Corrine Brown (D-FL)—daughter, Shantrel 
Brown-Fields, is an associate at the lobbying firm of Alcalde & 
Fay, which represents forty-four Florida government clients. 
12. Representative Connie Mack IV (R-FL)—son, Connie Mack 
V, is a senior policy advisor for King and Spalding.  
13. Representative Jim McCrery (R-LA)—wife, Johnette 
Hawkins-McCrery, works for Ketchum, a full service public 
relations and communications firm, and is a registered lobbyist.  
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14. Representative Steve La Tourette (R-OH)—wife, Jennifer La 
Tourette, works for Van Scoyoc Associates, which represents 
such companies and organizations as Alcoa, Lockheed Martin, 
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.  
15. Representative Jim Clyburn (D-SC)—cousin, William Clyburn 
Jr., received $60,000 from two consulting firms to seek federal 
funding for the Augusta, Georgia, airport. Representative 
Clyburn earmarked $2.5 million for the project. 
16. Representative C.W. “Bill” Young (R-FL)—daughter-in-law, 
Cindy Young, co-founded a lobbying firm that helped Dynamic 
Defense Material secure funding for body armor. Representative 
Young sits on the House Defense Appropriation subcommittee.  
Former Notables 
? Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD)—wife, Linda, works for Baker, 
Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell, which represents American 
Airlines, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin Air Traffic Management. 
Daughter-in-law, Jill, is registered as a lobbyist with JD 
Consulting, which represents Northwest Airlines and Freddie 
Mac through Sullivan & Baldick. 
? Senator John Breaux (D-LA)—son, John Breaux, Jr., was hired 
by BellSouth in 2001. He works with Orion Refining 
Corporation, DaimlerChrysler, Distilled Spirits Council of the 
United States, and various Medicare service providers. 
? Representative Tom DeLay (R-TX)—brother, Randolph, of the 
DeLay Groups represents Reliant Energy, Brownsville 
Navigation District of Cameron County, and Dunn-McCampbell 
Royalty Interest. 
? Representative Robert Matsui (D-CA)—wife, Doris, was 
previously a lobbyist for nine clients at the law firm of Collier 
Shannon Scott, representing Fannie Mae, Verizon, and the 
Advanced Medical Technology Association. Following her 
husband’s death, she became a member of Congress. 
? Representative Lindy Boggs—son, Thomas Jr., is a powerful 
D.C. attorney-lobbyist in the areas of tax issues, health care, 
international trade, and insurance. 
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? Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA)—now Chairman of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission; wife, Rebecca, is a 
lobbyist for Continental Airlines. 
? Representative Jim Nussle (R-IA)—wife, Karen, represents PBS 
and UPS.  
? Representative Harold Ford, Jr. (D-TN)—father, Harold, of the 
Harold Ford Group represents Bone, McAllister & Norton; the 
Community Oncology Alliance; and Strategic Government 
Solutions.  
? Representative W.J. “Billy” Tauzin (R-LA)—son, Billy, works in 
the community relations department of BellSouth. 
? Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA)—daughter’s, Karen’s, 
lobbying firm, Solutions North America, Inc., works on behalf of 
foreign interests. 
? Representative Michael Oxley (R-OH)—son, Elvis, resigned as 
executive director of the Ripon Society in June 2005. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
POWER COUPLES AND THEIR SELF-IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS 
109TH CONGRESS 
SENATE 
Legislator Lobbyist Self-Imposed Restriction(s) 
Senator Kent Conrad  
(D-ND) 
Lucy Calautti, chief lobbyist 
for Major League Baseball at 
Baker Hostetler. 
Lobbyist spouse does not directly 
lobby lawmaker spouse.1 
Senator Elizabeth Dole  
(R-NC) 
Former Senator Robert Dole, 
lobbyist at Alston & Bird. 
Lobbyist spouse does not directly 
lobby lawmaker spouse.2 
Senator Byron Dorgan  
(D-ND) (Chairman of 
Democratic Policy 
Committee) 
Kimberly Dorgan, lobbyist 
for the American Council of 
Life Insurers. 
Lobbyist spouse does not directly 
lobby lawmaker spouse; Senator 
Dorgan does not sponsor legislation 
that affects spouse’s clients; lobbyist 
spouse does not represent foreign 
clients, as Senator Dorgan is one of 
the Senate’s international tax 
experts.3 
Senator John McCain  
(R-AZ) 
Cindy McCain, chairwoman 
of Hensley and Company 
(beer distributor).4 
Senator McCain will recuse himself 
from issues affecting the beer 
industry.5 
Senator Dick Durbin  
(D-IL) (Democratic 
Whip) 
Loretta Durbin, lobbyist, Vice 
President of Government 
Affairs Specialists.6 
Lobbyist spouse does not directly 
lobby lawmaker spouse.7 
Senator Jeff Bingaman 
(D-NM) 
Anne Bingaman, lobbyist on 
communications and antitrust 
matters.8 
No policy on record. 
 
 1. John Solomon, Lawmakers’ Lobbying Spouses Avoid Hill Reforms, WASH. POST, Jan. 
17, 2007, at A1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.; James Ridgeway, All in the Family: When Blood and Marriage Bind Lobbyists 
and Politicians, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y., N.Y.), Aug. 19–25, 1998, at 41.  
 4. See Craig Holman et al., Family Members Lobbying Congress, PUB. CITIZEN, Nov. 
30, 2006 (app. 1).  
 5. James Ridgeway, Smoke, Mirrors, and White Noise: Campaign Notebook, VILLAGE 
VOICE (N.Y., N.Y.), Jan. 19–25, 2000, at 32, 32, available at http://www.villagevoice.com/ 
news/0003,ridgeway,11890,6.html. 
 6. See Holman et al., supra note 4.  
 7. See Peter Eisler & Matt Kelley, Public Wary of Links with Lobbyists; In Poll, 80% 
Say It’s Wrong for Relatives to Lobby Lawmakers, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 2006, at A1.  
 8. See Holman et al., supra note 4; see also Nick Baumann & Oliver Haydock, 
Washington’s 60 Sizzlingest Power Couples!, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1, 2007, available at 
2007 WLNR 10641120 (Anne Bingaman previously earned $2.5 million from Global Crossing 
to lobby for an FCC ruling).  
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SENATE 
Legislator Lobbyist Self-Imposed Restriction(s) 
Senator Ted Stevens  
(R-AK) (former 
longstanding Chair of the 
Appropriations 
Committee) 
Catherine Stevens, lobbyist 
(formerly on appropriations 
matters).9 
Lobbyist spouse lobbies freely.10 
Senator Tom Harkin  
(D-IA) 
Ruth Harkin, lobbyist, 
international affairs and 
government relations, for 
United Technologies 
Corporation; Director, 
ConocoPhillips.11 
Lobbyist spouse does not directly 
lobby lawmaker spouse.12 
 
HOUSE 
Legislator Lobbyist Self-Imposed Restriction(s) 
Representative Roy Blunt 
(R-MO) (Republican 
Whip) 
Abigail Blunt, lobbyist for 
Altria (parent company of 
Philip Morris). 
Abigail Blunt does not lobby the 
House, and Representative Blunt 
claims to recuse himself from an 
issue that affects Altria exclusively.13
Representative Luis 
Gutierrez (D-IL) 
Soraida Gutiérrez Arocho, 
lobbyist for Popular 
Securities, Incorporated.14 
No policy on record. 
Representative Maurice 
Hinchey (D-NY) 
Allison Lee, lobbyist at 
Patricia Lynch Associates.15 
Married February 2006. Lee was a 
former aide to Representative 
Hinchey.16 No policy on record. 
 
 
 9. Editorial, Family Ties, Cont’d, ROLL CALL (Wash., D.C.), Feb. 11, 2004, available at 
2004 WLNR 4022255; see also Paul Kane, GOP Makes Issue of Daschle’s Wife, ROLL CALL 
(Wash., D.C.), Oct. 26, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 4025331.  
 10. See Kane, supra note 9. 
 11. Norman Jane, Nussle Will Wed Lobbyist: Karen Chiccehitto, the Bride, Once Worked 
for Newt Gingrich, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 5, 2001, at B1.  
 12. See Eisler & Kelley, supra note 7. 
 13. See Glen Justice, When Lawmaking and Lobbying Are All in the Family, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 9, 2005, § 4, at 3. 
 14. See Holman et al., supra note 4. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Betsy Rothstein, In the Know (Representative Hinchey to Marry His Former Aide), 
THE HILL (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 25, 2006, available at http://thehill.com/in-the-know/in-the-
know-2006-01-25.html. 
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HOUSE 
Legislator Lobbyist Self-Imposed Restriction(s) 
Representative Steven 
LaTourette (R-OH) 
Jennifer LaTourette, 
registered lobbyist as Van 
Scoyoc Associates.17 
No policy on record. Jennifer joined 
Van Scoyoc by the time her affair 
with her former boss, Representative 
LaTourette, became public.18 
Representative Jim 
McCrery (R-LA) (ranking 
Member, Ways and 
Means Committee) 
Johnette McCrery, Vice 
President at Ketchum Public 
Affairs.19 
No policy on record. 
 
 
 17. See Solomon, supra note 1; see also Senate Considers Spouses’ Unique Ability to 
Lobby, CONG. QUARTERLY (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 17, 2007, available at http://www.cqpolitics. 
com/2007/01/unique_ability_to_lobby_1.html. 
 18. Marisa Katz, Family Ties, NAT’L J., Jan. 31, 2007, at 47. 
 19. See Bruce Alpert & Bill Walsh, News from the Louisiana Delegation in the Nation’s 
Capital, TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), July 25, 2004, at 4 (president of firm states 
Johnette was “a great catch for her experience in media and politics”). 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
FORMER POWER COUPLES AND THEIR SELF-IMPOSED 
RESTRICTIONS 
Legislator Lobbyist Self-Imposed Restriction(s) 
Senator Tom Daschle  
(D-SD) (Former Majority 
and Minority Leader) 
Linda Daschle, high-level 
lobbyist with clients primarily 
in the aviation industry.1 
Linda Daschle did not lobby any 
member or committee of the Senate 
while Senator Daschle was Leader of 
that chamber.2 
Representative Jim 
Nussle (R-IA) (was 
defeated in his bid to be 
elected Governor of Iowa 
in 2006) 
Karen Nussle, lobbyist for 
PBS and UPS.3 
No policy on record. They met with 
the House ethics committee before 
marrying to avoid the appearance of 
any conflict of interest.4 
Late Representative 
Robert Matsui (D-CA) 
Doris Matsui, former lobbyist 
at Collier Shannon Scott.5 
Doris Matsui would not lobby any 
member on the House Ways and 
Means Committee, of which her 
husband was a senior member.6 
Representative 
Christopher Cox (R-CA) 
(left the House to become 
Chairman of the 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission in August 
2005) 
Rebecca Cox, head of 
government affairs for 
Continental Airlines.7 
Rebecca Cox did not restrict her 
lobbying activities in any way.8 
 
 1. Jim Drinkard, Majority Leader Daschle, Lobbyist Wife Vow to Keep Careers 
Separate, USA TODAY, June 5, 2001, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/Washington/ 
june01/ 2001-06-06-daschle-linda.htm. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Craig Holman et al., Family Members Lobbying Congress, PUB. CITIZEN, Nov. 30, 
2006 (app. 1). She remains a registered lobbyist for the Public Broadcasting Service, among 
other clients, according to the U.S. lobby registration and reporting disclosure page, available at 
http://sopr.senate.gov/cgi-win/m_opr_viewer.exe?DoFn=3&LOB=NUSSLE,%20KAREN& 
LOBQUAL==&sequence=1. 
 4. Norman Jane, Nussle Will Wed Lobbyist: Karen Chiccehitto, the Bride, Once Worked 
for Newt Gingrich, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 5, 2001, at B1. 
 5. See Mark Wegner, Doris Matsui Will Run For Late Husband's Seat, CONG. DAILY 
(Wash., D.C.), Jan. 10, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 387930. 
 6. Juliet Eilperin, The Ties That Bind on Capitol Hill, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2003, at 
A19. 
 7. See Nick Baumann & Oliver Haydock, Washington's 60 Sizzlingest Power Couples!, 
WASH. MONTHLY, May 1, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 10641120. 
 8. See Paul Kane, GOP Makes Issue of Daschle’s Wife, ROLL CALL (Wash., D.C.), Oct. 
26, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 4025331. 
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